Eastern Illinois University

The Keep
Masters Theses

Student Theses & Publications

1971

An Analysis of the War and Peace Position of
Senator Edmund Muskie
Cheryl Kaye Keyser
Eastern Illinois University

This research is a product of the graduate program in Speech Communication at Eastern Illinois University.
Find out more about the program.

Recommended Citation
Keyser, Cheryl Kaye, "An Analysis of the War and Peace Position of Senator Edmund Muskie" (1971). Masters Theses. 3992.
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/theses/3992

This is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Theses & Publications at The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses
by an authorized administrator of The Keep. For more information, please contact tabruns@eiu.edu.

PAPER CERTIFICATE

TO:

Graduate Degree Candidates who have written formal theses.

SUBJECT:

Permission to reproduce theses.

The University Library is rece1v1ng a number of requests from other
institutions asking permission to reproduce dissertations for inclusion
in their library holdings.

Although no copyright laws are involved,

we feel that professional courtesy demands that permission be obtained
from the author before we allow theses to be copied.
Please sign one of the following statements.

Booth Library of Eastern Illinois University has my permission to
lend my thesis to a reputable college or university for the purpose
of copying it for inclusion in that institution's library or research
holdings.

�
'

�.' ltfZI

Date

I r eispectfully request Booth Library of Eastern Illinois University not
alloW my thesis be reproduced because
-----

Author

Date

/LB1861-C57XK445>C2/

AH AIULYSIS

OF THE WAR AID

PEACE

POSITICll 07 SENATOR EI>roliD MUSKIE
(TITLE)

BY

CHERYL

KAYE KEYSER

THESIS
SUBMlffiD IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER

or ARTS

IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN IL L INOIS UNIVERSITY
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

c

..

1971

-

. - - '

YEAR

I HEREBY RECOMMEND THIS THESIS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING
THIS PART OF THE GRADUATE

ACKNO\./LEDG.f.WT S

The author would like
Dr.

E.R. Tae at

B. Morlan and
ad'Yisement

to expreee

appreciat.ion to

the Department of Syeeoh, and to

Dre. Donald

Bruce c. Wheatley tor their assistanoe and

v:lth the present thesis.

ii

TABLE 01 CONTENTS

Ac:K?iO�TS•••••••••••••••• •••••••••• • • • •••••• • • • • • •
Chapter
I. THE PROBL»i .AND D'§INITION OF TERMS•• • • • • • ••

• • • • •••

iEVIEW OF THE LITERATURE• • • • •• • • ••••• • • • ••

5

•

•

•

• • •• •• • • •

5
6
13
14
17

METHOD OF PROCEDUllE AND M.A1'ERIALS USED•

20

•

•

•

• ••••••• • • • •

The Selection or the Materials Uaed................
The Method of Procedlll"e.• • •• • •• • • • • • • • • • . • •• •• •• •
•

•

Treatment of tha Data. •• • • •••• • •••
US'ULTS or THE S'TUDI.••• • • •• •

Ilatrocl\IC,tiOll. •• • • • •

Report
v.

l

Historical Background o� the U.S. Involvement in
Vietnam............................................
Signitioant Issues on Vietnam, Since 1968......... . .
Muskie-The Man family Backgrotmd aDd Education.....
Foll tical. Career.••• . • • • •• • • •••• •• ••• • •• •• • • • • • • • •
Pu.blic Opini.on. •• • •• •• . • • • • • • • • • •• . • • • •• • • ••• •• •
Senator Muakie's Identification With the War Issue.
..

IV.

1
1
2
3
4

•

•

III.

1

IntrodllCtion. • • •• . . . •• . • . •• • • • • •• • • • • •• • • • •••• •• •
The Problan. • • ••••• •• • • • •• • •• • • • • . • • . • •• ••• • • • • • •
Importance of the Study.• • • • • • • •• •• • • • ••• • . •• • • • •• •
lJ.ai tations of the study.•• • •• • • • • • • • • • •• • • •• • • •• • •
Related St\klies. • ••• • •• . • • •• . • •• • . •• •• •• • ••• ••• • •
Organization ot the Remainder of the Study.........
•

Il.

• ••

Page
ii

•

. •••• • • • •• • •• . • • •

or the Ree'11.ts•••••

•

23

•• • • • • • . • • • • • •

23
23

•

• •• •• • • • •• • • • • • . • • • • ••• - •

SUMKARI AND CONCLUSIONS• • • • . • • • • • •••

. • •••• • • ••• • . • •

S\lllll&rJ'•• •• •• • • ••• • • • • • • • • •• • •• • •••• • • • • • • • • • • •
� ot the Results.............................
Concl'USions.• ••• • • •• •• • •• • • • •• • • • • • • •• •• •• • • • ••• •
•

•

•

•

•

BIBL.IOCilAPHI.• ••••
APPJ!:tiDICES.• •• •

•

•

•• • • • • • •• • • • •• • ••• • ••

• • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

iii

•

20
21
22

• • • • • •• • • •

• • • • • • • • ••

• • •• •• •• • • • • •• • • •

18

�
43
.48

• • •••• • • ••••• • • •••

51

• • • • • • • • • • • ••• • • • • •

56

•

CHAPTER I
THE PROBLlll AiD DEFINITION

OF TEBMS

Introduction
A

telensioii

new# broadcast in

even

though Senator Muskie

tra:n

his native state

was r unning

November, 1970, stated that
for

re-election in the Senate

of Maine, he was also considered to be a

prominent Demoorat.14 hopeful tor the ncaination £or President in
1972.

1'he Deaoeratio part.," conaidered Mr. Mukie to be one of the

prmieina

c andidate s tor

a hiatorioal

th.a 1972 iTeaideutial Haaination.

Therefore,

critical atudy of this prCEineut, oonteaporer;y, polit ical

f11Ul'e vaa undertaken.

stateunt of the ProJ;?lg
The pro'blea

of t he present 1tudy vae to locate, describe,

aDd analyse the central ideas on the Vi•'bwn War iaeue farwarded

� Sen.at.or EdaUDd Muekie

u show

b7

e.

critio&l ��is

of the

Seutol''• political �it.ion on the VietDaJn War issue frcm 1968 to
aid 1971 aa

revealed through his speeches, public statements

and

prese releases.

The Vii:tnam Wer

ve.s one of the
l

strongest issues in the

2
1968 ire1Bidentiu.1 Campaign and prClliaed to remain an active iesue
in

the

1972 President1&1 Campaign.

::3enete, a le&dar in hio part.y,

vaa

Mr. Muskie was

a

leader in t.be

the Vioe-l'residential Candidate

tor 1968 and according to the Gallup and Barrie polla vas a f'rollt
rwmer for the 1972 ?residcmtial Democratic Da!U.Mtion.

1

.Becaue

the Vietnam W&r vas so ourrent and significant aDd becauae Mr. Muskie
was 8.

praninent contender fer tbe 1972 rreaicient.ial nc:m1nat.ion,

present study becae

the

important.

14111tatio;1 ot tbe StWy
Thie etudy did not include all ot the Dlllleroua apeakere
vho

haYe delivered speecbeB ar llade &t.at.ente ocucern.ing i.tie

Viet!l&m War iss�.

It did not consider the proa and oon• ot the

var

issue in general or include all of the ditterent. issuas vitb
which Senator Muskie vaa identified.

The toous or the stud;y dealt

onl,- with oonator MU3k1•'& poaition 011 the Vietnea War ie sue .

preeent st�

vu

not

a

Tbe

rhetoriaal �ais of only oa.e of �nator

Muskie's epeeobea on the 'lietnaa War isaue but dealt with the
Senator• s position on tbe

apecific iaeu. ot tbe Yietna W&l"J

tberefore, Dtak1DB t.bia at\ldy iaal»-orienteci in natve.

It 0Dl7

coverec.t opeechea, pre•• rele...a, aDd at.ateaente from Summer 1968
to Spring 19'!1.

1a. W.

Apple, ri72 Jiace Hae Begun 'for Muskie: Sta.tr Feel s
His Commitment to ltuu ia lrr•TOeahl•," Ipxon TiM•. (S.ptaber

21,

1970),

p. 32, col. 2.

3

Research into the literature has shown that there are two
studies 'in progress" relating to Senator Muskie, neither dealing
with the Vietnsm '-Jar i saue fran 1968 to mid 1971.

Mr.

Dan &Iden

froM Southern Illinois University and Mr. Judson Ellertson from
Ghio State University are doing their doctoral dissertations on
Senator F.dnnmd Muskie.
Concerning stwies on the Vietil8D wer, research has revealed
two studies which also corresponded
F.dvard Dracbman wrote a
in

1968

with

the present stwy.

dissertation at the

University of Pennsylvania

where he discussed the United States policy tovard Vietnam

from 1940-1945.

In this dissertation be traced the beginning of

the Vietnam conflict through many changes including the United States
in volveDlent. 2
Also in 1968 Stephen

Garret

from the University of Virginia

wrote a dissertation entitled, n An Intellectual Analysis of Foreign
f'olicy Arguments: The Vietnam .Debate."

In this study be compllred

analyzed Vietnam policy arguments in terms of
His whole study vs.a centered

around

basic

and

characteristics.

the oontinuing issues confronting

the developnent of American foreign relations.3

2

&:lvard Draohman, "U.S. Folicy Toward Vietnam, 1940-1945"
{unpubliebed f'h.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania., 1968 .

)

)Stephen Garret, 11.An Intellect'*1 Analysis of Foreign Policy
{unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Arguaents: The Vietnam Debate,"
University of Virginia, 1968).

4

Ch�pt<'>r II
incl\deci

&wiey ot tb.t ui9ratm:e.

-

historical

A

backgl'O\IDd ot

Vletn.i::=, 1.he sicnificani

i�mll:'u

1968. and Muoki.,..The Ma1L

Too

careor

ver8 tNated

umer ti.

the U.S.

tl;a;t.

Thie chapter

involvewnt in

h&.w beccae dadnant aince

re.levant

unectc ot Senator

Mu:ikie' �

tollowiq be&dingst Frul:r Bf\ck�OllDd

and F'..ducetiont i>oli ti cal Cerf.�!', : ul:i"..:1 o Cp.inimi

and ${).oator Huki• 1 a

Idmrt.ifj.e1\\ion "11.h � War J:()aue.

ch&pte.r reported
14"0Cfldure

�

t.i. wol�@tloa er a&t@i-1.e,and tti. M'tbod of

Oil

au

well

Cbapt'"'r IV

-

a�

t.h. treat.oat. Qf tba cia'\a.

ia11ltoif tM >a:wr rED}>Orted

th�� lipplica.tion Cl! t..bi!>

apecific

t,b(ll

finding.a fr<X!I

¢r1 terie. to the ·�-o.bla' vuhlio

stat.et,. � pnse rel..•.s et S.ut.or Muld.8 tl"m 1968 w aid 1971.
Cb.apter v

-

§=mr g1 £Mnl•'w a....tse4 the stll.ly

and

inclWl.. \1Wt eo11i1t luiw ..._ � tlMt wlyaia ot the rea>ultrs.
s.

W.b.U.carapq

biblio"°a� provi4aci
u.t.G.ri&.ls

r.w �-

Ai-i�ndix ll

am tw app4t1'CliOG• followci Cbaptt<>r v.

a

lia1t1D1

at�.

iuollde4 a

d

'Ille

iapol'tani. backp-owaid and ooarce

ApP'tailx

A inclurl�

letiera ot eorrespomonce.

oow Gt •4'Cll � � lllpllbl.JJsa.d apeeebec, preas

>:elo.._., am\ a�a.

CHAPTF.R

II

REVIEW OF 'l'H.E'LlTmATURE

Historica} Be.elcgroupd 9f U. s.
Inyolytment inYiet,atm
The Vietnam War has involved the administrations of
.Presidents Eisenhowr, Kennedy, Johnson and presently Nixon.
Each of the four have regarded the Vietnam War isBua according
to the changing climate of public opinion and their own sense
of f�esidential responsibility.
'l'he defeat of the Japanese in World War II created a
colonial vacuum in Indochina which the
to fill.

The

Fre nch tried unsuccessfully

French military defeat at Dienbienpbu, Mey

8,

1954,

by inaurgent Vietnaaese forces pr9cipitated the solving of the
Vi etnam problem through the Geneva Conference of 1954.

The

United States bec ame involved in the Vietnam crisis through the
Geneva Conterence.
Much of the U.S. initial involvement in the Vietnem

conflict vu atul veiled in secrecy but American military support

of tbe government of South Vietnam co1>.tiuued to escalate through the
Eisenhower,

Kennedy and

Johnson Administrations.

Fresent policy

under the Nixon administration was one of announced Vietnamization,
de-escalation and w1tbdrawal.

5

l"nGident

1aoreue

Jobaaoa

felt it we.a

t� U.S. toroeia 1D Vi�.

nec•aee.ey 1a

area

to

b tot.al allied etrrengt11

Ad bt>oaM eo extell.aivo that. it bild bE:�ui termed
•aehin& ln ar.a

l96S-l966

�a

ball the aize � 0&.llfand.a�;.il

tull-acalo wer
la

e'1'pj>ert

ot

hia eeeala1.1oa polio7 lTeaiclent Jolmaon »aid,
h&'f• ottacd •aotiatidD#, 6l'ld ve ban fought harcl,
ocnrapoul.7, oa lmteailiar terr!kJ7, w1 tb an
incre&.liDi camnit.raent ot plan&s, sh!pa, e.nd grenlf1 tnrceu,

Wit

We

all Chaiped to bring \be var to ead vlth boa.ol'.

•om•r 1cpWM &.lt
Tba nen

aipit1oaat ehel2g•

vh:S.eh took. pl�ee in t.be pollc7

a.eking ot the Vlcbea \la wa• the IC'f'•ber, 19681 bcabin& halt 1.eawd

bl' rneident. J�.

aocordirJI

to

The tabing halt seemed to be a

S..tora 0.-Ding

D90eaaity,

and Beae•r.

li>and �' 11@\Rlll.Bw lit vot In.• H0{%9 Qet Qj.\,
(ltev torlta at.bene•• 1968), p. 58.
211Gwvd Zina, DGD••
a.aeon Ph3a, 1967), p. 121.

Thi IQc1o ot tAtWnnJ.,

(hatCIU

7
United Statea mill tary invol vement in Vietnam is open
ended and unless there is soms sor t of de-escals.tion on the
part of the United States, the extent of future Ul'lited S tates
military involvement will be determined by North Vie tnmn snd
not by the United statee. U.S. Jlilitarr escalation in Vietnam
instead of stopping Communi.Slt, as contended by its e.dvocates,
actually benefits the Soviet Union and Commun ist China which ,
vithout committing a single m<!n to combat th1'3re, see more
8lld more U.S. armea forces engaged in cc:abat with a primitive
peasant people and m e and more U.S. re s ource s diverted to
�
meet military needs.
In the beginning of October, 1968, the vq vas opened for a
ccaplete ce s sati on of the

had vorked out

bonbing
of the

as a

a

banbing of the 5orth.

The administration

fomule. under which the United States would halt the

step toward peace, expecting in return that the abuses

demilitarized zone as vell a.a Vietcong or Horth Vietnamese

attacks on the cities or other populated areas vould c eas e and that
Hanoi

would

e11ter prcnptly into serious political discussions
that included the elected government of South Vietnam. On
October Jl, the President announced that aa ot 8 A.M. fridq,
Noveaber l, be was ordering a canpleta ces�ation of all the
United States sir, naval, and artillery baabardment of North
•

•

•

Vietnam. 4

The

bcnbing halt vas termed '�a. first step in unilaters.l de

escalation. t15

Nixon's UetpemjzationJ·o1icz

The p rincipal question that was asked in

waa whether Hixon would

Jenuary,

move still more rapi dly to

1969,

de-escalate

the war and witbdrav American troop a or vhetber he would proceed
3Ernest Gruening and Herbe r t Bea.ser, Yietnamf2l;J.y,
(Washington D.C.: National Press Inc., 1968), p. 375.
4lienr;y Graff,

Hal1, Inc., 1970),

Aiw Tue@day Cabinet,

PP•

(Hew Jersey: Prentice

157-158.

5MarJ .KcCartey, lii·noi, (New York: Harcourt,
World, Inc., 1968), p. 95.

Brace, and

s

elowly' enough to �rmit

quitf: :d.tllar to

bis

Crig1ntlly
of

tt-.e

o-aretul �Viatnudcation1i

of

too

predecessor.

�8.PY

o�rs believod that Nuon

vantcd to

19% vhet�v&l' the circnmstances, �h.11e others contended be

planning to

move 1tcre

ulovly' aTJd ge."Up

the vi thdra111.LI.�

aede by tbtt C0!11111mtiat�. 6

Vrecidieint N.iXQn

h&� deacri

bed the

to tlw

e«i aence Of' hl s

\lal..>

11o•e�

Vieto-1 zation

being the tro...�3fer � &round OCllbat rolea frca .F.aet1can

Object1YC

!ho dcv�� or µrogreefJ in building up and tr&1Dint:
South Vietn&at!"9 !oreea so that thBy CM te!rn ov-�r fl'<D
1iMrtc&ae; tbe 9MIV'• maiato:rumce ot a redu.eod
ot
1'1iil1tery �c-tiv:l.ty; Nld pl"Ogl"$6S at the Peria talluJ.

le.,l

The r'rc.sider:rt alone, ot cour-s•, bas the

power

ot int.l-pr\:tifli

whether or � th�se conditions er�

being mot, end

wh&ther

ware.Gt cOD1.i.lro.ed vithdraw.l.

In

the exte-nt 1 �

fact,

with

halt ot 1970
was

sufficient to

the criterion

ot tbi) level at emar •1lit8!"7 actirlty

6aobert. Sbaplu, 4.M

Yorks
7

(lev

Harper

Vietn.ll and aeMle

to apply to

Bo�(ESWW@=Viet;'• 19'S-l97o,

and Rov, 1970:,

?P•

2�0, J2G.

Brown and 1on Acklaad, ed., WllyA£s Vp StiJ,J. ip Jittw,
Rand• House, 1970), p. 2S.

$aa

Yorlu

6pocitical.17

�opect to th9 eecODll prepoaitioa, dwiag the tirst

expanded geograpbicsll.7 b&yond.

(Nev

mor�

9
Laos and

Cambodia as vell.

postulatea

Rather, it

peace plan.

Vietnamization

military approach to the

It

to relieve

was meant

for

the

be

South Vietnam, in a

acc ept abl e

to

var, by appearing to shift the fighting

Vietnamese forces even though a

to be

played by

American troops and

wey which

Americans.

responsibility
fran U.S. to

decisive role was actuaJly

pi lot s for

that the shift in ground cot!bat

hoped

most

J.:inerica.ns of feelings of

South

It vas

meant to be a

contin uation of an es senti ally

problems of

the administration hoped would

not

ve.s

years

to cane.

roles from Americans

to Vietnamese would be subste.nti�.l enough to keep U.S. casualties
dO'Wll to a

level that a

majority of

the American public would

re gard

as tolerable.
Shortly

after he

dis engagement

a preoipitous ft.merican

for

disengagement

draval

polic y ,

a precipitous

in

yet

November,

lead to turther

or

his open-ended vitb.

1969, President Nixon claimed that

1odthdre.wal

the councils or

abandoned their

and left the time schedule

In support

undefined.

.American

reckleaeness in

took office, President Nixon ruled out

goals o�

wo uld v.t.thout question

those great powers vho

promote

h a ve not

world conquest which wo uld prestm1ably

conque st s.

It the level of

enemy

activity

significantly i n creases
U I

we might have to adjust. our timetable accordingly .
conclude

that

increaeed enemy action jeoperdizes our

rama1ning forces in VietnBlD, I shall not hesitate to take
8
strong aud effective measures to deal with the situation.

Open-Eprleci Versus Fixed Daj;e lij(hdrwa1 }'oligx
Due

to disenchantment by the .American

people, there ha.a

been stro� controver sy concerning the wi tbdrawal

8
JW., p. 7.

system.

Nix.on' s

open-ended vi.tMraval-Vietnsmiztl.tion
the itQJ'ltediate witbdraval with

e.

policy h&.s been cc.npared to

fixed

"The

tinl¢tablo.

unilateral ,Jithdre:wal is that it Jllakee th1D end of thCt

ot aDTone•s consent but our ovn.
i� r1ght"9

is a

sanity
var

of

i.Dd&�ndcnt

It is clean cut, it is swif't, it

sample Of tho slogan

eupported b'/

Nixon oppoaition.

iile.lter 1..1p11!lan has au:ime.rized vhat he c onsi dered the embiguity and

confll:lion in curren t Viotnam policy.
tim� in the history of

"This

is just about

the firet

warfere that a nation thollint it could prevail

by withdrawing canbet troop6 and I'eQuciD& ita military presence. 11

Lippman contended tliat the Nixon adminiatration was uot seeking
disen�gement s.t all but

\raS

trying to

bt.q- petf bnce

full

6lld. endurance

tram the Amer.lean peopl() for a.a indefinitely .l.oag occupation in
South Vietnsm. 10

Geor�

unequi vooal policy

McGovern ru:ivocatGd, "We ne6d a eleart

whl.ch vi.ll lead to

our invoJ.vement in the War.''

promis�d

a

a.

syatem.atio termination or

Ifo offered an amendtuant in which he

flprogram of witbdravo.1 which punctuates the urgenoy and

necessity of an orderly American disengagement.

It

set.a

out the

eort ot unequivocal polioy needed. t.o bring to a close the sed

epioode in .berict.n

ll
Ilistocy. 11

three eeuentis.l rcaquiaites:

(l)

Bis progrsa for disengagement had
a

total withdrawal of American

all."lOUllOldd aJld date for th� completion o! v.itbdraval

forc�s,

(2)

&Dd

ccanplotion of v.lth.J.rawal &t an

(.3)

ail

9 Zinn, P• 1S5.
10
Brew and Ackland, p. 15.
11

11&4·,

P•

126.

oer17

time.

11
lJ"iaoner-of-War Issue

'I'he most recent issue in withdrawal policy i� the prisonersof-wer issue.

The

l rc: sident called for immediate release of all

prisoners of war held throughout Indochina, irrespective of
progress tovard agreement on any oth�r items.

According to

Irw:ln, Unde r Secretary of State, ha.d this pro po sa l beon

John N.
acc epte d

by the other side, our men could be home now, and the

Vit tnamese prisoners heJ.d tr..roughout Indochina could also be home.

12

The administration believed strongly that a fixed timetable and

announcement w ou.ld not serve t he interests of securing an orde rly
end to '.merican i nvolveme nt in the war or an early relea.se of our

prisoners. The argunsnt hna been stated that if a reo.sonable date
for U.S. total 'Withdrawal

"Was

set , the North Vietnamese would

be willing to cease firing against U.S. troops and release our
This argument ign ored several important points.
Irwin, Under S ecr etary of

S tate ,

believed that as lon g

FOw's.

John N.

aa the

cease-fire was not universal, our men would still be exposed to enemy
fir� because of their support for the South Vietnamese forces.
far, the .President's call for

the other side.

So

a total ce a se-fi re had been refused by

A:so, in all their statements, i nc luding those made

at the most recent session of the taris talks on April 291 1971, the
other side

had limi ted itself to a cOIIID'.itment to discuss th� release

of our pri a one r s if we announced a reasonable withdrawal date.

They

continue.lly linked actual rele ase of prisoners of war, �s opposed to

mere discussion or the quest1on1 with the settlement of the var

War111

(June,

12Jobn N. Ir.dn II, ''Vietnam : Ending U.S. Involvement in the

Cun-jutForei&n folicY,
1971

•

Department of State FUb.Lications 8589,

12
on the basis of their political demands.

These statements by the

North Vietnemeee end their southern supporters, plus their stee.df ast
refusal to give any interlocutor

a commitment to do more tht>Jl

discuss the FOW question if we ennounced a withdrawal date, suggested
that announcement of such a date on our part would be met with
demands for further concessions rather th81l the release of our men.13
AB can
over issues

be witnessed by the exem:i.nation of the controversy

end policy changes identified here, there were mal'l3'

points of rlew.
public opinion

as much

aa

my major

political issue

of the twentieth

The range of opinion has represented 'the extr•es as well

century.
as the

However, the Vietnam War has divided .American

middle gro\md.

i�tration policy

was

"Hawks" who have felt the of'ticial .Admin-

weak to the "Doves" who

have advocated immediate

disengagement of American influence in Southeast Asia.
Ty¢cal of the

"Bavkish'' response wu the statement by

General Curtis Le May, retired Air Force Chief' of stafft

The United States must be \d.ll1ng to continue
until every work of man in North Vietnem is gone.

banbiJl.i
We

should bomb the irrigation system on which food production
largely depends, and every facto17 and never ending.so
long

aa

there are two bricks still

stick togetber

•

.l.4

Viewing the situation fran the opposite Tievpoint, David Schoenbrun,
news anaJ.y-st
in Vietnam

and commentator for C.B.S., characterized our involvement

ae tragic:

The tragic story of hov ve
involved in Vietnam and
how we then got deeper end de-eper into the death-pits of
that country, trcn the first cautious Eisenhower dispatch or
aid to Kennedy's less prudent but still noncamnittal dispatch

got

13
262-265.

,!W.

l
4"Vietnam Ieeues, ''

Catholic Wm;:ld. CCVI

(March,

1968) 1

13
of advisors, to the fateful Americanization of the ver
by Lyndon Johns , to the now que1Stionable Nixon
ad!!!ini�tration.

taiother
u

y�

position was posed

by Arthur

�hle�inger

call for unity, Md R$Sertf.\d that rnutucl.

��s

essenti�l in t�

Vi�tnam

truest

as

be

gave

!lll!ODf; .AJl'lericans

controversy.

For �!he��r tbe outcome of tho Vietnam debate

or

of

later debates that miq de.rken our future, the essentio.l
thing is to �es<;rvA .mutue.1 trust �mong ourzfllves as
.Amoricans.
Lot u.s remember that those vho take a
different p<>flj.tion Wh(;tth<�r they Yruat to ov11 cuate Sdgon
or bomb Hanoi � also be actueJ.ed by honorable and
p�triotic motives may whatever their dcgrecG of error,
btill bava a genuine concern for peace end freedom

.Lst

w:

always dil'lting\rl.sh betWGen dise.grP.r::nent a."ld

•

<!iolcyalty, between opposition e.nd tree.eon. Let us
never forget thnt complictJted µroblem� (!en 'be r�solved
only by reasoned analy6ia; and that
insist�nce
en r�ason is tho rina.1 hoDo of de�ocrst1c soo1ety.
Ir ve can r�embt:r this, in vho.tever direction and
deci51ons and deatiny ta!i:e ue, we can �aserv·., e.nd
/,
cherish our fUIJd�ntal unity Of purpo�e QS .AJnfsl'iCB.np •. �

the

MM§kie-Th� Man P'aw11y �g.gkg:roWld
Nil F,ducnt•sn
F.dmund Sixtus Muskie

Though

1914.
as

Cl.

boy vbo

quiet

\U\S

a5

r;

Wti�

bcrn in Ruriford, ?Wne, Msrcb .28,

child, he 8t111 manug£:d to

deetim�d for �uccens.

the.t he thought that wl1<:n

impress people

.:\ friend of the

F.,d grew up, :t�e vouJ.d oit

her

feml7

bEs

a.

said

biebop

or f"resident of the United St.ates.17
1-i'uslde

&tee

College, where he va.a

15

Co.,

graduated frca RUl!l.ford High 3chool in 1932, attended

Schoe.abrun, P• 60 •

16Schlesinger,
P• 126.

1967),

EZIOS?.

rbi Beta Kappa end a niember of the

17u.�.,

Bj.ttlr H•riitl••

(Boston: Bougbton.-Mif'flin

Q9QBte'1oi2f1a:l.Recor4, (Septemb�r

16,

1968), CXIV,

He graduated from &> te s College, cum laude in

debating team.
1936

,8
•

..i.

Afte r this step in his life

he enrolled

at Cornell

Lew

School where he received his I.J.B degree three yee:rs later.19

Upon graduation from Cornell, Muskie went to New York to be
interviewed by a Wall Streft law firm, but instead of pursuing

that idea be opened

a

l:llllall le.w firni in :·le.terville, Maine.

Shortly after, World War II called him to duty.
engineering and deck officer on a. d estroyer

He served as an

escort

in

the

United States Navy.20
1-ol i ticel C!"reer
He consi de red himself 11sober11 about politics.
that politics vas not

a.

business in which one could plan very far

ahead, much less aim for
spotligbt.21

He thought

e

MU!lkie said,

gli t er ing plE·.cs in the national

t

"The princi pl e objective of my

whola

political career in public life has been to give ev0ryone an equal
chancG to improve their

11ve s. 11

22

When he r eturned to Waterville in 1945, after thr.:; war,
he sought to pick up vbere he had left off in building a lav
practice but abando ne d it a year later to

run

"Muskie of M�ine11,
18susan She€han,
(Nov embe r 22, 1970), Sec. VI, p. J.JO.
19
U.S., Copgres@iongl Record,

for the state.!
New York Times,

(September 16, 196$), CXIV,F.

7087.
2

20Ibid.
2111F.dmun
22

d Muskie,"

Senior Scb9lastic,

(September 27, 1968), 9.

Steven Roberts,
"F.dmund Sixtus Muskie 'l'akea the Low Key Road,"
(October 28, 1968), Sec. VI, p. 321 col. J.

NewYork Till.es,
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logi�latur�.

Local re�ocratic leaders in search of fresh candidates

,

for the offic� epproeched him and he

In 1946,

quickly a0cepted.

be was aloctcd to the office of the Maine House of Representatives
an'1

began his politic al career.23

Waterville and lost tho only

1968 elG c t i on .

He

Wt'!.�

In 1947, he ran f�r Meyor of

e le c ti on

re-elected to

in his

�areer previou s to the

the state legislature in 1948

In 1948 he became the floor leeder of the handful of

t.?ld 1950.

Democrats.

boon after his second re-electlon to the leg'lslature,

he resigned to beca5e Maine Director of the Office of Price
Stabillz{l.tion.24

He reoigned this position the naxt year to became

t·!ainc 1 s Democru.tic Nationtl COl'Uni tteemG.n.

In

a

wna.11

Republican

dominet�d state like Maine, this post was not too honorable and
often lerui to the nomination for governor or senator.

he was approached by

a

group of

praainout

was

Congress when

t o weak.

o

1952,

the state party

In 1954, he had decided to run for

t he same group of aen again urged him to make a bid for

the statehouse.

6

He reluctantly agreed to try.2

the incumbent, to become
decades.

In

Democrats to run for the

governorship, but he declined because he felt that
organization

25

Muskie,

defeated

Maine's first Democratic governor in two

As the Nation' 1 first Polish-kllerican governor, he was

invited to attend various .hilaaki

dq oeremonies anci Kosciusko

2311Ecbnund Muskie, 11 p. 9.

f27087.

24u.s., Congressional Hecgrd,

25
Martin Nolan, 11Huskio of lo1aine, n

(July 13' 1967)'
26
F..27087.

(September 16, 1768), GXIV,

p. 44.

l'hc Rep2rt;r, XX.XVII

U.S., Congreµsi2£41 Recctg, (September 16, 1968), CXIV,

16
festivals.

2?

In 1956, h�1ren again

for governor and received

the largest vctc Qver given a Maine govern or.

In

1958, MUskie

decided to c:h!>.llenge Republica.n incumbent Frederick
the

Senate.

fayne

and becs:.:.o the

the ·1·eonle

1970.

'lhough th� underdog

Fayne

for

at the out3et, he overwhelmed

first Democratic senator ever elected by

of Maina.28

He ran a.gain

for

senator in

1964 ruld

�uskie was the Democratic nominee for Vice-President

of

r--c

the United States
In

in 1968.�1

his fir st weeks in Washington in

1959,

he defied

oue of the cepitol's most powerful men, Senate Majority Leader,
Lyndon Johnson.

Johnson asked all the

their �uppor� in

beating back the biennial

freshmen

sen�tors for

liberal

attempt to

change the Senete rules to weake� the grip filibustering southern

exercise

senetors could

over the body's affairs.

Muskie did not

support Jo hnson; thus Joh!lsou gnvs h:i.u1 the last three commi ttee
choices which

vere

Banking and Currency, Public Works, and

Government O�re.tions rather t.han Muskie's preference of Foreign
Relti.tions. JO

'!his

incident

was beneficial to Muskie because he

U:J�d it wisely.

'Mee in 1965 he

advance in

leadership because of his deference to the vi.shes

party

passed up the opportunity to

In 196?, he passed up an opport'lmi.ty to be in the

of others.

Nolan, 9. 44.

27

F.:27087.

28u.s., Congreaeioaal Record,
29

Bui ldiug,

16,

1968),

C1IV,

senator &imund Muskie, Biographical Data, Senate Offi ce

(March, 1961).

30u.s.,
F2.7087.

( September

Congressional Recorg, (Septfo)or ber

16,

1968),

CA.IV,

..
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third

ranking post of the p!'rty hierarcy.

he was too

He se.id

involved in projects in the three committees initially assigned
to him • .:n

Public Ql)inion
Because of Muskie' a 1:Linco!neuque11 method and style of
handling politics he has obtained

variou s kinds of public canment.

In the Senate he was known for a clean a.lld

a

tendency to speak softly

and briefly and

deliberative manner,
a

degree· of modesty

\Dlusual in a chember of such towering ambitions.
spoke 0£ him

geilled

a

well

8.6

a

"man who esche'As publicity, works

�;aid he lacked "charisma and oherm1:.
A

hard, and has

deserYed reputation among hiB colleagues for

integrity, fair dee.ling and cffet�tivcnoss. 1:32
also

Senator Mansfield

But Senator Mansfield

33

reporter traveling vi.th Muskie found biJl

generate t he kind o f excitement which
Presidential contender.1134

normall.J°

M\lllable

to

surrouxxls a

Similar to this another reporter

said,

"Muskie's trouble is that he is essentially an introvert running
for

an

ert.roTert' s

he seems on.able

31
32

job.

Though

tbo�tful �bout ideas and humanity,

5
to get involved with flesh and blood people.113

�.

.DWi·

33J.F.

Riobard, "The Remaking of Muskie,"

CCXII, (February 22, 1971),
34

�.

35

�.

p.

236.

Tbe Natiop,

18

Identifi cation With the

War Issue

In September, 1967, Muskie went to Vietnam at fresident
Johnson's request to observe the election that was held to
legitimize President Ng'Zfen Vsn Thieu'a regime in Sr.igon.

By

J anuary, 1968, the blood shed he.d begun to worry Muskie to the
point where he privately wrote to the President and a.eked him
to stop the bombing of North Vietnam as an effort to open peace
negotiations.

He vent to the Chica.go Convention and became

involved in the struggle over the Vietnam plaDk when one of
Humphrey's men came to him and asked him to help in trying to
acccmodate the ha'Wks and doves.
had become a symbol,

a.

By this time the banbing issue

kind of moral watershed, of where a

man

6
stood on Vietnam.3
Muskie was asked to def end the strong Vietnamese plank
at the 1968 Democratic Convention.

Muskie recalled.

When Humphrey asked me to organize the speakers
for the majority plank, I took the lead speech. I
thought that although we ha.dn' t been able to change
the words or the plank to the extent sOJile of us
would have liked, I could give the words an inter...
pretation that would aocomodate both groups so that
we could have a Vietnam policy eve1'7one could live
with.
Words became symbols to people, but as I see
erence in the planks was a matter of
it, the �
f
�ems.tics.
Since 1969, he has called for an announced schedule for the
withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Indochina.
36sheehan, Sec. VI ' P· 1 .3
3

J?

l,W.

•
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Although he had taken a position in the 1968 Democratic
Convention and he made a statement concerning

his 'Withdraval

position in 1969, yet "Senator Muskie has been slow to step out
on

his

own .

Cn Vietnalh, in particular, he he.s bec;:n exceedingly

cautious in �970, e�en to the point of refu�ing to speak on
Vietnam . 11.38

liovever, the public unvt:iling

before the National Press Club.

ci:.?M.�

in M}!rch, 1970,

Se:no.tor Mu��kio finally

out with his first major statement against the

war.

came

The opening

round of the nev campaign �hasa of isaU1D-orieut�d speeche � to

key a\Xliences vae eucoessful. 39

Finally in associ<.1tion with his

identification vith the war issue he \las branded, 11Mr. Gurb
the Military . 114°

F..1-8 54.

38u . s . , Congressiona1 fteoorsi , (March 11, 1970) , �-v:vr ,
39
Richard. P• 2J6.

·
M·

'Sheehan, Sec. VI, p . 29 .

CHAPTER III

METHOD OF PROCE.DURJ� ;J�D l{i\TERIALS USED

§election of MateriaJ.s
The
steps.

select

ion

of the criteria vs.a accanplished in several

Several rhetorical. models were revieVBd.

that the models provided by
Nichol s , 4 e.nd Croft,

5

f'arrish,1 Baird,2

It was observed

Wrage,3 Hochmuth

for the most �;srt were designed to deal

primarily

as a rhetori cal. aMlysia of

del ivered

by

one certain person,

on

one

specific speech

a specific occasion,

but the

present study was intended to be issue-oriented thus, dealing
with a

ntmiber

of speeche s , press releases, and st atements ,

covering the period of time from

1968

to mid

1971 .

It became

apparent that it was not possible to a:::'lY any one rhetorical

\1axfield

. !Jnericen

Speeche�.

Wayland Farri sh
New

York:

2A . Craig Baird,

Nev York:

3Ernest

J.

Wrage,

XXXI II (December ,

Public

.

�ie

Addre s s .

1947 ) .

liochiznrth,
New York:

5 JU.bert J. Crof't,

u.nd �.arie Hochmuth Nichols,

Longmans,

Green 6.lld Co. , 1954.

tunerio§n Public .Addresses. 17/t0-195.?.

McGraw-Hill Book Co . ,

end Intellectuel History " ,

,

1956.

" Public .tiddress,

A

Stu:iy of Social
of

Ihe Quarterly Journel.

Speech,

A Hi@�2U 100 Cril42iS111 pf ,Americw

Longmana, Green Co. , 1955.

"The Functions of Rhetorical Criticism11 ,

Ilw Ql!arj;erf[ Jownal. of' Spepcb,

20

XLII (October ,

1956 ) .
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model

to this study.

models gave insight

Howver, a study of theee rhetorical
into sane questions that later developed

into the oriteria used far analysis.
initially developed .

Twenty four

questions vere

Due to repetition and questioM that went

beyond the realm of this study, the twenty four que$tiona wre

canbined and ineorpcreted

into

the criteria for a..11,.i.lysie .

three major questions which became

It wa8 belleTed that the three

question criteria vould better suit the purposes of the study
than

vould any one rhetorical model.

The

criteria us9d -were

a• f'ollows:
1.

Wb.&t wre the central ideas presented by Muskie
concerning his position on the Vietnam War issue'l

2.

In what wey vere Muskie ' s central ideas supported
in order to ju:.;tify lrl.3 position on the 1ssuc?

3.

1-lc.ve m:::..jor pol:l.cy changes effected revisions or
mod1£ications if any, of his positions?

The speeche s,

press releases, and statements that vere used began

with the date that Senator Muskie was first identified vith the
Vietnam War issue to

March

1, 1971.

MethoC) gf ?roce<lure
Letters vere written to Senator Muskie, the Senate Office
Building in Washington, D. C. , and
all

speeche s , press releases

and

to his Preas SecretOl"'/ requesting
statements made by Senator Muskie

concerning the Vietnam Wer issue tran 1968 to mid 1971.

Ji.. s a

supplement to any materials received fran those sources, the

NevYork Tiae&, Vital Speeches of tb@ Day, and CAAgressiona1 Recom

22
provided

many extra

speeches, press

that deelt \dth the Vietnam
press releases,

War

releasee and

i s sue .

and statements vere

stats ent s

A total of 40

speeches,

used for analysis.

It was not possible to check the speeohes for textual

accuracy since no audible transcripts were available.

It wa.s

assumed that the text of s.11 the speeches, press release s , and
statements wre as acc urate

as

could be determined .

Many rhetorical models vere previewd.
insight to

same

questions that

should be

These models gave

answered in an analysis

of Senator Muskie ' s apeeclies, press releases, and statements
concerning the Vietnam War issue.

A

three point criteria was

then devised.

'l)"ee:tment of th! Data
The speeches,

prese

release s , end

statements were

compiled and then arranged cbronologically.

The criteria were

pplied to �3ene.tor Muskie's public positi.on(s) on

the

Vietnam

period from the SllllUr ot 1968 through

the

Spring of

a

during the

1971 by enalyzing

the

War

scope of hie position as applicable to

eaoh criterlon in order to locate, deseribe , and IUllUyze the
central ideas on the Vietnam War issue forvarded by Senator Muskie
fran 1968 to present .

CHAPTER IV
RF.SU�'lS OF THE �TUDY

lntrod:uct1@
The problem

describe , and

addreseed by this st\¥1.y was to loaate,

analyz.e

tbs centre.l icieu

forvarded by $enator Muski e ,

as

ahown

by

the �nator ' s politioal pronouncements
fran

1968 to mid 1971.

Chapter Ill

The three

were cGJls14ered

a

focus

vas

a

on

is:sue

critical &nalysis of

the Vietnam War iosue

point criteria. prsaeutf!d in

�t-.er measuring inotr\J'ilent for

the preeent et� tbaJ& vou..Ld an.y one
previ�wed since the

of the Vietnam War

of the rhetoricul modela.;

issue-oriented over an ex�nded

period of time .
The dat.a for tbe s't\rly were BlTtmged cbrono1og1cally then
a.nalyzed

by

each point of the three criteria.

the results reported in this

l.

cllaptsr.

'!he United dtatee ahould support
A.

T'bo imalyeis revealed

a

negotiated 1ettlement .

'Ihe wer should be settJ.ed by a political aettlement
and not by a Jlilitary victory .

23

B.

We must camnit oareelvea to disen.gaganMmt,
mu.st 1mp1e-.Jr!ent thet conmdtrne11t b-'J tnC!lllS of

w
u

ph�!tt'!d pl�'Pl of ��thtlr�Yal pllred to � timetEble ,
r.nd 1 n plm:miag thftt t1motnble '� r"'USt r.eoi· to
;irr.!.'lc� tb� proc�ccts fC!'

c.

�iecretary

�

P.11 the £r ot1 en!':
��tt.int the :.;tf..g:J fo-r s.

f�tor

.South V1etna:! in

E.

amonr

bcJnbing hRlt ShOUJ.d bP at'tdf,t�d
"'� vi 1.lingn.:i as to negc-ti�.ts .

c�'.l euJ.at\:.ld. ri sks abould
fl.

B.

be teken in tbo

e11.gibil1ty tc

sign Of

l\rea::i.:

Tho only way

ve

run fo-: officn.

vould achieve tbt: goe.l

pri �011('.r 5 of ·,mr w:.is

negotia.t.00 'Jettlement .

).

S.6

e�� r.Jf'-fire, withdrawal Of forcns ,
��1tabli3m�m. er c.n interim govorn.�ent, ol1gih111ty

Of

retm"n of our

2.

of

w�r.

fl

t.o vote r:nd

F.

:-;?ttl.::�(\nt.

C·3.!laral U Thant shoW.d be asked to

Her1P. tS.r. t:!.\d

!)G� itice1 3�ttl�nt or th�
n.

::it'lgoti.: t. d

of th1.,

tb:-ou�

c.

�n.igon aho�d not ht;ve veto !><>WT& over our efforta

explore

ruw

l,roys t� end th.�

Viotnomization

Vi,�tnt'.m.

policy

ve.e

war.

not

the road to pe(:oe in

Saw.:1tor Munkie the mo�t dcsdnf\Ut was :td. n i n�ist�ncei.� for

dev13;loped 1n 1968 .

to

8

n�goti�t.e:d

Dur-1.ng the thirty month time period cov�Ted by

this at\ldy be baii spoken in �1:.•ar of this position on twenty two
occe.sions , in Rddition to the msb&r Of U.m�s he

spolce"

en the

Terious supper-ting ieouee.
t�ugu!t 19, 1968-DemoCTatio F1 atfcm Co:maitta<-:
r.uguet 29, 1968-M.tljonty I1�nk
e-eptember ll, 1968--tJnivel"�ity of Notrt' Deme
jeptat>b!ii!?" 11, 1961!-Indiarmpolio
Septeaba l.8, 1968-CommomreeJth G!. ub-- �n Francisco
October 15., 1969"-Be.tee Gollop
October 16, 1969-Uni?Wci.ty ot Tenneseo�
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Nove!llber 3, 1969-Congref:s
Nove�ber 7, J 969--Ccngrese
November 14, 1969-Dinner in

Honor of Congres�f:.11

J effery Cchel;n-Oakland,

5 , i97r --.National l-'re��
March 26, 1970--Ccngress
April 3 , 1970--Congress
April 10, 1 970--Congress
.March

Club

C�Jifornia

tle..y 11,

1970--Congress
MAy 1 2 , 1970--Colby College
July 5 , 1 970--New York Times

&?.ptemb�r 22, 197C--Congr� �G

January 23, 1971--California Democratic State Conventi on
.January Jl , 1971-University of Hartford
February 23, 1971--University of iennsylvania
'I'ypical of . hi s position \las the statement made in a major speech
before the lfational 1-re�s Club, March 5 , 1970.
an end

to the

wsr and an end

11I be li eve that

to our involvement in the war can be

brought about only through a negotiated se ttlement . 11

1

,

Sene.tor Mus�ie s upported bis contention that a negotiated
settlement waa needed

One of theze

by developing six sub-points.

was the position that a political settlement was the answer to
endi ng the war rather than

a

military victory.

fre quently that.- 1·r�s1dent Nixon pref erred
that

respect

Nixon � he charged , was like

a

mi-Li tary victory.

Joh..�son.

the importance of the political settlement
ending the war.

lie repes.ted

as

In

Muskie reitereted

the only

answer

to

He supported this position on eight occasions.

September 11 , l968--UDi.ve�eit7 of Not�e Dame
October 16, 1969-Uniftr•ity of Tenne ssee

November 7, 1969--Congr�ss
14, 1969-Dinner in Honor of

�fovember

Congresm.an
Jeffery Cohelan-Ou.k ls.nd, c�J.ifornia

March 5 , 19?0--Nationc;.l Press Club
March 26, 1970-Congress
May il, 19?0--Congresa
July 5 , 1970--New York Times

1
U.S. , Qongressional Record.

(March 5 , ::970 ) , CXVI, 53094.
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Typi cal of the eight times he called for
and not

a

political settlement

military victory was the address delivered at the

a

University of Notre Deme, September 11, 1968 .
• • • the war ,
should not be settled by military victory ,
The terms of
but by negotiations to end the fighting.
the settlement would be the product of all disagreement
2
and controversy; this i s the American way .

His position (Jn setting a definite de.te for withdrawal wasanother sub-point of

a

negotiated settlement .

His position

became stronger beginning in early 1969 vhen he said he had
many que stions as to whether that route would be the best one
to ptn"sue.

He becmne very strong on the issue in October, 1969 ,

s.nd has addressed himself in support of this position seventeen
times.
October 1 5 , 1969--Bates College
October 16, 1969--University of Tennessee
Ncvember 3 , 1969--Congress
November 7, 1969--Congress
November 14, 1969--Dinner in Honor of Congressman
Jeffery Cohelan--Oakland, Californi a
March 5 , 1970--National Press Club
March 26, 1970--Conuess
.April J, 1970--Congx"ese
April 10, 1970-- Congre ss
May 11 , 1970--Congress

May

12, 1970--Colby College

May 17, 1970--State of Maine Democrs.tic Convention
July 5 , 1970--New York Times
January 23, 1971--California Democratic State Convention

January 3 1 ,

1971--University or Hart!'ord
February 20 , 1971--New Republic

February 23, 1971--Uni versity of Pennsylvania
Typical on his position on withdrawal vas the statement he
delivered at Bates

College1

Leviston, Maine , October

15,

1969 .

I believe ve must disengage our forces-.-in an orderly

Wfq as soon as poseible.
2

Cl£11'ton Knowles,

York Times,

I vould hope that our witbdre:wal

"Muskie Deplore s Discord on W'c.r , 11

(September 12, 1968 ) , p. 42, col. 1 .

�

27
program could pave the vsy for a political settlement
between the social and political tendencies in South
Vietnam.
To facilitate this objective, I have
advocated that we propoee a standstill ceaee-fire to
open the way for negotiated settlement and a quick
end to the fighting end killing.
3uch an offer could
be accompaniP.d by a reduction in our offensive

operations . 3

The essence of his statement on vitbdraval, January 23, J 9'71,
at the Galifornia State Democratic Con•ention expressed his
concern that

en

open-ended policy vas only a continuation ot

the war and was dangerous tor .Aznerican troops and prisoners or
war.

That the United States should set thair ow vithdraval

procedure independent ot Saigon and should set

ot hie

withdrawal date, vas the eesence
his address at the Uninrslty

ot

a

definite

withdrawal position in

Pennsylvania,

Pebruary

2), 1971.

Senator Muakie recOl!lliended that the administration ask
Secret81'Y General U Thant to se�ve as mediator at the Paris
peace talks four tlllea .
November 1.4, 1969--Dinner in Honor of Congres smen Jeffery
Cohelan-Oakland, California
March 5 , 1970--National Preas Club
April 10, 1970--Congress
May 11 , 1970--Congreee
He believed the peace talks were not resulting in

an

agreement

partly because a qualified person was not present to mediate between
waring parties.

Be

thought U Thant could close the symbolic but

important protocol gap thet
negotiations.

was

presently standing in the Wfl3' of

Typical of hie statement s, was the one he delivered

at a dinner given in honor of Congressman Jeffery Cohelan in
Oakland, Californitt, November 14, 1969.

3Edmund

Washington D . C .

Muskie,

"I believe that

''Letter to Maine, u Senate Office Building,

(October 28, 1969 ) .

Secretary General U Thant should be asked to serve as a mediator
among all the factions of South Vietnam in setting the stage for a
negotiated settlement of the war . " 4
Senator Muskie ' s position on the bombing halt has changed
over the period or time covered in this analysis.

Research revealed

this change was represented by a politically based inconsistency
in his private and public position.

First he wrote a letter to

President Johnson in J anuary, 1968, asking him to halt the bombing.
In

early August, 1968, he stated that

risky.

e.

premature halt might be

Later in August, he made thi s statement to the Democratic

1�1a.tform Committee .

eve

11 1 beli

a bombing halt at this time,

as a test of North Vietnam' s intention as a further demonstration
of our willingness to take the illltiative toward peace, me.y be
juetified. 115

announced he

ADd on November 2 . 1968, vhen the

reiterated, �the action was

the first s'iep to

ending the

Tb4t idea of te.ld:ag

Mwskie

bQmbing halt was

a nece•sit,"

elMi waa

var. "6

"calolil.ated

risks" wae appealing to

and in the tille period coTered in

the aneJ.7sia be addressed

thia issua on three oceaaiou.
Septeaber 11, 1968-Univereity of Notre D8lH
September lS, 1968-- Canmonwealth Club
Oetober 30, . 1968--.rican Hotel

�und

Muskie, "Dinner in Honor of Congressman Jeffery
Cohalan, " Senate Office B\11.lding, Waebiugton D.C. (levember 14, 1969 ) .

5iieyYsrk 'lilies.
6ilom.er

Bigart,

(August 20, 1968), p. 26, col. 6 .

"Mwikie Asserts Halt in Banbing Was Not
Timed fCYr the !lection, " Ney York fl.Its) (November 21 1968 ) � p. 21, col. 7 .
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These thre e occasions only covered
before the ele cti on.

position that he
that the

no

a tvo month period ilmaediatel7

Analysis suggested this to be an e arly
longer found primary snd abWldoned.
a

bombing halt was

He felt

calculated risk and th�t more calculated

risks should be taken 1n ot�r areas of decision making.

Typical

of tbis position was his statement to tbb Ccamonwealth Club,
San Fr&noi eco , September

18, 1968.

ilWe ere going to have to take

certa.in calculated risks in the pursuit of

long uccepted the

He

necessity

advocated

of

the ideas

taking

peace,

c alculated

just

as we have

risks in vaging

for the return of our prisoners

of war by a negotiated settlement four times.
July 5, 1970-New York Times
September 22, 1970-Congress
January 23, 197l�California stnte Democratic Convention
FebruaJ')" 23, 1971-University ot PenneylTania

The dates of 1970 and 1971 suggested a fairly u.v poeition growing
out of the recent prisoners or var issue.

that

the prisoners of

war

be williD& to negotiate

we" ve-ry important in the United states
He

deeiaion making process.

He repeated the fact

continued to

c .e:.cbange

Of pri

say that Hanoi would

soners

if they knew

the United States governmeat vaa se�ioue about negotiations .
serious negotie.iionB Mr. Muaki• aeant setting
in order to bring
it

W6'.S

our

pri Bonere of var bale.

vital.}¥ important �hai the

timetable they mq set.

Xork T1me11 (September

aak

detinite timetable

He also believed that

UGited State s

He continued to

rlStephen Roberts,

a

By

atio.k

to any

the queetion, vby

r'Mukie Discerns Wish for Change , " 11.w

19, 1968 ) , p. 39, col.

1.

should Hanoi be vil1ing to negotiate it the United State s continued
to bicker concerning a means of witbdrawal?

Similar to the other

statements, was the one Senator Muekie delivered before Congl:'ess,
September 22, 1970 •
the only way we will aohieve: the goal or a return
or our prisoners is through a negotiate.d setttlement . And
we must continue to press for the undertaking of serious
negotiations of all aspe<':ts of terminating thiu var, with
the prompt release of ell .American
i soner:s in Vietll81'1
of the highest negotiated priority.
• • •

f"

To accaapany his ujor position for

Senator

&.

negotiated settlement,

Muskie de"leloped three secondar,r poeitione one being that

Saigon should not have veto powers over the United States .
appeared that the possibility
to Mr . Muskie.

of a

It

S::igon veto ves significant

He thought that the withdrawal problem should be

eolved by the United Statee setting

a

timetabl� and permitting

Saigon and Hanoi to negotiate accordingly.
the President was faltering before

a

Senator Muskie believed

Canmunist dictatorship because

he allowed de.igon to have vsto power over �he United States in

8Jl1 decision it made.

This

vaa a position that he mentioned five

times.

September 13, 1969-Weat VirFDi& Federat.ion of
Democratic Women
October 15, 1969--Bates College
1'0Yalllber 7 , 1969-mma:resa
November l.4, 1969--Di.mler in Honor of Congres sman
J.etf•'f!7 Cobal�.kland, California
MArch 5 , 19'70-NatiOIJ.8.l. h-ess Cl'®

Typical

of

during a

Sl6134.

bis poe.1tion on this

maJ w

iasue

we.a

the statement made

speech deliv.red. at Be.tes College, October

8u. s . , Congres;ion•J Recot9,

15, 1969.

(September 22, 1970 ) , CXVI,
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"Now is the time also to make clear to the Saigon government that
we will not permit it to veto our ef'torts to explore new ways to
9
end the war . 11

Senator Muskie believed that if the United States

vould set a detinite witbdraval date, Saigon would be willing to
negotiate accordingl� .
Senator Muskie ' s stand against President Nixon ' s
'

Vietnamization policy was that it vould not bring lasting peace,
because

ot

the increased use of troops rather than an immediate

total v.ithdraval .

He

also belieYed that the Vietnamization policy

was too slow and dangerous.

Tilt re were many soldiers being killed

while others, tew in number, were being sent home .

still f1ghting and dying should all be caning hane.
Vietnamization policy

VB.8

The young men
The

intolerabl e to him; therefore , a new

system vas needed, advocated Muakie .

In the data 13tudied, Mr.

Muskie stated this position sixteen times.
October 81 1968--Congreas
February 17 , 1969-lfniYereity ot Miem!
September 131 1969-West Virginia Federation of
Deaocratic Women
October 15, 1969--Bates College
October 16, 1969--Uniftreity of Tennessee
Ho-Yember ) , 1969-Congreae
March 5, 1970-Natloaal Press Club
March 26, 1970-Corigresa
April 3, 1970-Cengre ae
April 10, 1970-Congress
May ll, 1970-Congreas
Mey 28, 1970-Biermial Convent.i on of the
Jmalgaated Olothins Wort.re
Jul.7 S , 1910-lew York Thies
January 2.3, 1971-Callfornia Democratic State
Ooir•ention
January 31, 1971-University of Hartford
February 23 , 1971-Universit,' ot Pennsylvania

32

TJp.1.cal

ot

his poaition vu tbe statement he me.de in

major

a.

speeoh to the National J:reas Club, March 5 , 1970 .
I belieYe that the ·President' s Vietnemization
policy can be only a formula tor the perpetuation of
the var .
What the l're&ident ealls hia silent maj ority
is si lent only because it has not been made to realize
that altboqh eaae U.S. troops will 1» 8aning heme, ve
ere not really getting out of Vietnam. 1
He

reiterated three

to commit

time8

troops to

that

mt

felt that it

was

poor poliey

Lao s and Cambodia.

May 11, 1970--0ougreaa
January Jl, 1971-tJn.1.versit.7 of Hartford
Februa?'7 23 , 1971-Uni•erait;y of Pennql-.ania
He

believed

that

that the Nixon

this action merely

strengthened his viewpoint

Vietn8Dl.ization policy-

rather than ending

1t because of

into Cambodia Md Laos.

February 2.3, 1971,

.lt the

be stated ,

waa continuing

the increased use of

there, as I

border

ot

nll

President had a plan

8lllbiguous

and

troops

''I believe it vu wrong to unleaab

believed it wan

Cambodia.

war

University of Pennsylvania,

South Vietne.mese troops across tbe border or Laos
thea

the

wrong to

He reminded

bis

li

and

support

lead them aoross

stener • that

for ending the var in

Vietnam it

if

vas

the

the
very

it vasn' t working especially in situations where

the President was increasing the use of troops

rather than

decreasing them.

II.

Invhit yayyere Muakie 's oe;t.ral. ideu supported 1n 2fdo.r
to SU1titzh11 position oathl Jittp•p War 111\it?
In supporting hia ideas on the Vietna War iaaue

10
U.S. , Qgpgre11innnl Btcord, (Maroh 5 , 1970 ) , CJ.VI, S.3094.

1u .s. ,

1

G®ms1i0Mllegprd, (October 8,

1968), CXIV, SJ0009.
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Sena.tor Muskie employed the loi;ic&..l

with

a

le s ser

use

use

of exampJ � preodcJ!ri n�tf- ly

Hv mudc limi:Lt:tl

of caWJe-eff�ct.

mK

of ethical

and enotional proof � .
I n support of hi s strongo ::> t. position,

settlement , he d(:iveJ oped the positions that:
be

aettl0d

we must commi t our�elves to

3e cret ary Genera�

medie.tor et peace

(6) the only

talks, (4)

\Jal!'

should

(5)

through

a

d efinite timetable,

a bombing halt shoul d be attL�mpted
calculated

way we would a.chiev�

prisoners of war was

the

be asked to serve as a

U Thant should

to improve negotiation�,

{l)

settlement rather than by a mi 1.i te.ry

c

(2)

victory,

(3 )

by a po) iti aJ

rlt.. gotir,ted

R

ri sk o 3hould

be ta�e n

,

the goal of e. re turn of our

a negoti ated

frequently mentioned the f&ct that

&

settlement .

Ht)

i

militer-1 solut on was not

viable for Vietn8I!l, and it could not bring �eacc i n other
c ountri e s of that region.

sented was thi s

statPJnent

Typi cal of the

kind of

to Congres s , Mey :1,

vay to obtain movement tovard

a

1970 .

as we

proving itaeli'

that the

was re ally not trying i' o

settlement

but for

a

settlement if

Nixon

the

to the ;Un.erican people ,

r

military victory .

United St�tes certainly

have

Senator Huskie stated the present

administration was not

United States

''The

U6gotir..tcd settle!l1t..nt i s not

to redouble our efforts for a military victory
witnes sed in the past. " 12

support �re

felt ws.s necessary with

the

politiCt 1

He reiteruted tb�t the

could not work toward a

escalation of the

a

negoti�ted

Vietnam War continued

increase

of

his

ea

use of troops

in Crunbodia..

12U . S . ,

Congressional

Rocord,

(May 11, 1970 ) , CXVI, S6954·
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Senator Muskie incorporated his use of example in
support of his withdrawal position versus the .Nixon open-ended
policy.

Mr.

Muskie believed that

dependent on lliifioi 1 $
tht JJOlicy could

So long

President ' s tirootable was
wfl.T; therefore,

willingne ss to de-escalate the
� ?

not \lork . - "

fie gave this instance of the use

speech to Congress, .November

a

of cause-eff<:-Jct in

the

1969 .

7,

tha

United v�ates commi ts its foreign
its ground combat troops to the
successful prosecution of this war by military means,
the authorities in Saigon P..rc under no i:•ressure to
make t�e politic&l er �ilitary &ffort tnat i s
neces�ary if they are to tak� full res p onsibility
for bringing the conflict to a cl o�e . 1 4
policy,

as

as

well

�3

In essence, this instance stated that as long us the
continued in the same manner, they would have to
rcaponsibili ty for the consequenceB.

Sena.tor

to our own people

as well

as

the Saigon

a�sume

Muskie

that if we had an announced v.1.tb:irawe.l date then

United

we

6Dd Hanoi

States

the

believed

could nnnounce

government s that

w were tired of the mounting loss to our .:.mericen troops and
we

were ready to negotiate .

Most Americans wanted an orderly

disengagement from Vietnam but how best

could that

goal be

accomplished if the United States continued to defer the troop
v.1.tbdraws.ls

as

bad been dona in the past?

Senator Muskie again made use of cause-ef"fect in the
major epeech deli�ered to tho Nations.J.

13
(September

s33549 .

"Muskie Criticizes

14, 1969 ) ,

ll+u.s. ,

p.

19,

Frese Club,

Nixon Wnr Folic1 es, "
col. 1.

Congre1s1oM1 Recgrd. (November 7 ,

March 5 , 1970.
Bev York Ti;es,

·1969) ,

CXV,
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By his preoccupa.tio:n w-1 th Vietnami zing the war,
the l'reaiiient has turned his b&ck on rvric. By l�ttin� slmo5t
tour months go by \dthout se nding a senior personnel
1
repreaento.tivtl' to I &r i l.i , he has dow-gredod negotio.tion�. 5
Senator Muskie took
Secretary

talks.

a

firm stund concerning tho I-resident a.sk1ng

General U 'I'hant

The

to

act a� mediator in the

previous exBmple shoved

negotie.t!ng table

..:-

2rie

peace

what had happened at the

in its

because the-: 1..dministre.tion failed

reeponsibiJ itie s .
Senetor Muskie argued that
into the trap of

e

Communist dictatorship.

position that 6rigon
United Sts.tes,

should

not have

Senator 1'-lUBkie

referred at one point to

he said

i·rt.oidant Nixon

fi

he could not meke

it clear that it was

Tc

was

felling

support his

the veto pcwer

over

'believed that although the

tt0
Pr<.0 sident

fixed timetable for withdrawal, which
public, .his s·u.bsequent comments rn&.de

dependent upon 3aigon' s

ce.paci ty to teke

over the war and Hanoi ' s willingne as to de-escalate the war.

He used the form of example to furth&r support this position
that Nixon

was

cam.plying

complying to the

United

to Caigon1 s doms.nds

S-lratcs.

He stated

rathor

s.t the West Virginia

federation of Democratic Women, September 13, 1969 ,

Nixon was not

strong

enough

th1.1n S;:Jigon

that

fresident

to face realities.

President Nixon fumbled the ball badly in the
cease-fire es8oc1at.d vith Ho Chi Min.h' s death. It
aeeas like the President allowed Saigon to have a
veto over our action and didn ' t present the opponent
with a •fgcere view of thiti country' s desire to end
the var.

15u. s. , Congressi onal &cord ,

{March 5 ,

l6 nMuskie Critici ze s Nixon

Policies,·" p . 19, col. 1 .

War

197C ) ,

CXVI, S.3095 .
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his attitude

Because of

age.in

st

President Nixon ' s Viet.Dami zation

po� i cy Senator Muskie gave this example to the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America, Atlanti c City, Mq· 28 , 1970, of bow the present
policy was not working •
• • •

the President ' s po�icies are spawning d<aestic

unrest a.rid

intc>rnntj onel

r�ri l

for

/.reerica."'1 peopl e .

the

�

The war in Southeast Asi a and the arms race constitute
th£ grevast threa t to our invclvemsnt on� c?..n imegine. 7
Senator Husk� e further identif1€d his poeition on the iesue of

the intol�rabJ e V:ietnrunization
raJ.l ac1 ous

rei1soning

policy by giving

in en article printed in

an exa'llx:;le

of its

the NFW York Times ,

July 5 ' 1970.
The Pr e sident ' s indeterminat� schedule, which vould
keep a large U . S . force in Vietnam indefinitely, might
for�e Hanoi to move &gainst the rcmai� ng �.me.ri�ans,
triggering a new round of escalation. L

e

Other fallacie s that

were present in the administration

that Vietnamization was causing

poJ icy was

unnecessary .frustrations among

the young people 'Who que stioned our national morality, and loss

of faith in the c&paci ty of our 3ystem to meet the national needs

of � Americans.

Vietnemi.zation

P,Ositi on that the

To further substantiate bis

policy vas not vorking he stated in an article

reported by the New York AW§, July

S, 1970 .

"We have only to

look at what has happenad in Indochina and at what is happening
119
in om- country to see the folly of the pre sent policy. 1

l?

"Muskie Seys Nixon is Dividing Nation,

(May 29, 1970 ) , f• lC,

col.

2.

'1

New York Times,

18u. s . , QonrrvSsi9p•l Record ' (Jul.7 7 , 1970 ) , CXVI, �3162.

19
�.
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Mr . Muskie repeated bits belief that the vq out of the
vu does not lead tbro�h Cembodia.
or hostilities and the rate

or

The vrq to reduce thn level

Am�ri can casualties vas not to

send our men on ne..., search and destroy missions

Adainiet.ration
Mr . Muskie

vould have us believe .

reasoned

ae

the pre sent

Because of these occursneea,

that the Nixon Vietnamization policy vas not

vorkisaa to reduce the troops Wt inoreaee them inst.•ed.

He

etated that he beli ev•d �be action deepe•ecl our inYOlTelllent,

videned the var , and left
vented em needed.

'Q8

even further from the peace the U . S.

The ex•ple that be repeated on taree

ditferent occasions vas the atateaent in
of

a

speeeh at the Univereity

Pennsylvania, Pebruary 23, 1971.
The longer w lend our presence to this expanding
contliot, tbe lonaer tllia conflict vill emure.
And
the longer it endure s , the JIOre profound will be the
iDJlJZ7 done, not onq to \he people• of Vietaaa and
Caabodia and Laos , but to our own ccnmtrT, to our
aen vbo are killed or •ai•ed aD4 to their taailie1,
to our 1ust1tutiona ot learniq , to or proced\ll'e s
for &OYerning, to our coatidence i�ur aocie't7• •
ability to reach for ita own ideas.

As well as the much used logice.1 proof, Senator Muskie also
ethical and emoti onal proof• in a limited vey.
hi s

O\ln

October
OD

In

order

used

to build

etbiaal proof in hie speech at the Univera1� or Tennessee,

16, 1969,

Sen tor Muskie

a

supported his position to speak

an.y issue dealing with the Vietnaa War and substantiate

hie

authority.
have eng.,.O 1• a s.arch tor a way to eDd
and killing as a United States Senator
vbo aade tvo tripe tc that part of the vorld-one as

the

I

fighting

20u.s,, Q•mssigee2 i�JCQJ"d, (March 1, 197-0 ) , CXVII, 52162 .
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u

part of

Man::field Mi 3::d or. &"'ld one a.s a i:e.rt

the

of the 196? elE:ction observers group.
Further I
have read e:.;:tensiv�ly �'ld conf.u1 ted '111.th
-who

know

the

problemo of Vietnam intimately.

To establi sh his devotion to

!en

2

the cause of finding a wey tQ end

the fighting and killing in Vietnam, 3ewitar

Muskie continued

in Lis Sf:aec.b at tr�.:. Univ.:;rsit�· of 1enne::;scc.
JG
l;

ara

engag3d in the search for

a

'Way to end

the fighting and the killing, to give the Vi etname se
peoplo tho opportunit1· to vork out their own polltical
dastiny, and to lay grour.d work for a
appropriat�
poli�y in Southeast

United. States
Mr . 1¥'.:us:d.:1.;:;

"When

!.e

m��e

Asia.

�eci. er.totion� proof to sus.-port his poaition on r>ance

pe.inted the picture

Vi•:>tname se people

in

a

of pity and

speech

before

sympathy

for the

the United Jewish Appeal,

Febl·uary h. , 19?1..
I Gaw pictures the..t their children bav� draw and
hung en the walls of thes e vcr, ea.me shelt€rs, pictures
with no explosives in them, no e.i.rplane s or tanks,
no �€Ople with guns, � sight vhich they are accu.:3tomed
tc at pre�ont.
They e.re picture� of peace, of land
e.nd er the things they grew on the lll.Ild, cf bi rd o in
the sky, e.nd of people at "Work. er at :r;-est. I am
convinced thst we �us� do
�c cen to help meke
these pict\D:'es c<mie true. 2

�ll

III.

£..Jav� m�jor oolicv changes eff�cted reyisions or mo<lifice;tions

if §.PY• of b;in 'R2eitio?l§.?
�itbin th� period

vas discovered

of time c nsi dered

o

in this

study it

th�t out of the marv policy chznge s that have

occured there vere four

which

wre considered significe.nt .

21F.dmund

Muskie, 11Moratori'IJll Ylua One-A Me8D.ing, n
Office Building, Washington D. C .
\October 16, 1969 ) .

Senate

22
·
.nwl

23F.dmund

Muskie, "Muki• aqa Americans can learn fran Israel ' s

Cause , " Senate Office

Building, Washington

D. C .

(February 10, 1971) .
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(1) President Jobnson' s sacala.tion of the war,

poliq of wi't.bdrawaJ. o.fi'ered anothi::r ch�e .

'l'her�; hi:.s been much

debate u to an opea-�radeci withdrawal tilrletable.

debate

OTer the

pria�r• of war isaw.

Ill clee.lia,

with

no

(4) The r<!c�nt

another .factor
.

effecting

Jobu®' i escala.tiOL. �olicy, Senator Mualde

baa expnsaed acme opinion.
settlement vitb

wa:;

the ilr1pa.�t @f

(.2)

litit hb.s aince

1968

t;upported

a

negotiated

more ascalatio.n.

iii s poai.tiOA egaoerning tbe bombill& halt was that a
praature halt ill tb8 b<abi».g of . North Vietno:m c91L d hurt rather
thaa help

ia the

•&oi.iat.ions, unless Hanoi was willing to negotiate

a aettleae11"t . 24

JJ't.ar the bombing halt

believed that it

wao

balt vas a oacessity.

Muski"

wae

vae

o.nnounced

¥.r. Muskie

the ti.rat step to�ard negotiations and the

Even tho\lih it was dona in private, S�tor

so concerned a.bout tJw !'ightin& end kiJling in Vietnam

in 196? that he wrote a letter to

the Pr e side nt in January , 1968,

requesting a halt to thai baal.xi ng in order to influence the peace

talks.
Concerning

the issue of' a way to end the war, Senator Muskie

pointed out ia Soptember, 1968, "Negotiat\? witb. Hnnoi

&n

immediate

end of limitation of hostili tes and the wi thdra:wal from South Vietnam
25 This position referG back to
of all foreign forces . :i

that

if

we

announced

his belief

a withdraval timetable then Hanoi 'AO'Uld be

'Jilling to negotiate.

24.xnowles,
25
1968), 13.

:iSi de

p.

42, col. 1.

by .3idel!,

Senior .)cho:. t1.stic, XCIII,

(September 27 ,

40
Since 1968, Senator Muskie has stated that the Geneva
Accords would be an acceptable basi s for negotiatio�;
and withdrawal or military forces .

a cease-fire,

But he also felt that propostls

for immedi ate withdrawal had several problems .

Due to the continued

escalation of the war, no visible actioWJ of troop reduction with
the Administration• s Vietnsmization policy he believed an announced
witb:iraw&l was more and more imperative J therefore , his position for

a fixed withdrawal date evolved .
Relating to the release of prisoners of war, Senator
Muskie was concerned enough to amend bis article to the
July 5 ,

197C.

New York Times,

"We should stick to the eighteen month timetable

that I proposed subject on:y to Hanoi ' s willingness to release
all American prisoners of war . 11 26
To reiterate hie strong position for negotiations he
me.de this �tatement in an address to Congre ss, September 22, 1970 .
The o� way we will achieve the goal of a return
of all prisoners i s through a negotiated settlement
which calls !or withdrawal of troops.
It i s true
that all pri soners are not released until the fighting
ha.s ceased, but every atep 1ovard negotiations ie
another step toward peRce. 2

Senate-� Muskie repeat-;1d frequently that the only way

we

were

going to be able to reach any e.greement a on the issues which
concern us most

was

to make clear our willingness to negotiate

all issues of the 'l.lar.

He believed

of our Jimerican prisoners of
26

s16134 .

U.S. ,

ve.r,

we

a sefe vi thdrawal of all our

Cop.gressioDJ.1 R�copi ,
opgr9saionaJ. Record,

27u. s. , C

could negotiate the release

(July ? , 1970 ) , CXVI , Sl9679.
(September 22, 19?0 ) , C'AVI ,

troops now stationed in Vietnr.:.m, in addition there could be
a cease-fire between our troops and theirs whi ch could work

toward

agreemeri; s

to end the fighting in CLmbodia and U..os.

And the U. S . could encourage the Vietni;J':lesc parties to ucgotiste
a

political settlement that would restore a mee.suro of pRA.CC to

all of Vietnam.

CHAPTER V

SlHWtI JllD COliCLUSIOBS

It vu the purpoae ot this .tud7 to looate, deacribe,
and anal7u the central ideea

"1'

on

tbe Vietnaa Wcr is••

Senator. l'.dauad M\udde u show by a critical

Seaa� ' a polltioal prca.nnctlMlts
l
on
r:r.:, 19-68

to ll1ci 1971.

torvarded

�•1•

of the

the Vieta.a War 1Hue

Tbe acocapl.1•-..rt ot W s purpoee

in.YGlftd obtaining apeeclae1 , etataenta, ud pre•a Hl•aMa by

Senator Mukie trca tile .-..r ot 1968 to •:Prta£ Of 1971.

l•vxm u.a, Qmsreutea•, nua,
MallJ rbatal"ical aodel•
preMDt atl117

••

aat

nttl Spne"• s< tu

were previewd bt.tt eiaoe the

i••ue-oriented the

tollaviq criteria W&tri

j\ldpd u bet'ter euite4 tor the p\ll'pO• ot

th:roop
v.re

1.

e.a

•xkmled.

The

period fit U.. .

analJ'a.1111

aD:.< lasm

Ti. aiteria eeleated

three in n...-. .

Wba� wre ·ta. eentral i4•u

preaeded b,r

h11 po11ition on the Vietnaa War iee\18?

Mukie oonoerrdng

2.

In vb&t V8'3 ven Muald e ' • central ideas supported in cxrder
t.o j...ut)' Id.a poaitl• on tho 'fiet.ua War ieaae?

).

Ban

•.1• poliq ehaape
it 8f11 of hie poeitiona?

•fteoted

rnia!ou

or

aodit1cationti
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Tb" materie.le vero ecm.pi 1 ed and �rranged

eaoh criterion
to

analy ze the

ve.e

thrust and scope

the var val!! through

the 0.neYa

Accords

he believed to

not

I?

t ated

�

believed that the ' only vay

He

DeiOtictiona.

oureelvee

The se negotiations

Hovever, in May , 1970,

no single answer to ending

vas

tbffrefore ,

Vietnatlizaticm pol icy.

oolieved that

negotiations.

thet the war should end 1n
one ;

Muskie ' s poaition.

Senator

be the anever for peace.

military

commit

of

Muskie has

pro'ri.ded tor

he Mnt:i oned th�t ther�
�kie

Then

appl ied to the combin�d materials in order

Sinae 1968, !dnn.md
to end

chronoJ ogiealJy .

he did not

to d i sengagement ,

political settlement

t1Upport

thought

�nator Muskie

pha.,ed plan of vithdraval

e

implement

gee.rad

to

the ve.r.

Nixon' s

that w

that

should

oamnitment

e.nnouncPd ti:Rieteble .

by

e

!n

!)le.nning t�t vi thdraval the United States should pranote

prospects tor a negotiated

1969, Sen1ttor

politice.1 settlement.

Muskie eaid be had eerious

lo'YeabeP , 1969 , he ed...octtt�-d

v.1tbdrev1t.1 .

an

�stions about 1mmed1ate
announc

i ng

date � in Hny, 1970 , be ottered his De-claretion

Ind.ochi.nn wM!'fJ hf) gaw.

(D�oemb-·r ,

sJ\

a vitbdrewal

for

Peace tor

ei ght �ga menth vithdrm.ie.l dstl'.'

1971 ) �ubject only to Hanoi ' s villingness to ralcase

tbe J.tteries.n prl�oners of WU

and to

viibdraving

�eauae

p«>licy

October,

In

American troops.

Sene.tor Muskie

promi se the aaf'ety Of

ot th� V1etn8lllizat1on

e}>..anged hi s witbdrs.wal policy

196<? , and bae meinte.ined that poei ti on.
Seerotary General U

Thant

e

the

HP

in

advocatc-4

NovE-rtber,

that

hould be asked to be the mediator

at

the

t-aris peace

Before

talks.

than help

unless

H'ter the

enno

Hanoi wanted to enter serious negotiations.

uncement of the bombing hs.lt Senator

tMt the ha.1 t we.a j UBtified
to an end.

This

believed

Muskie

and ve.s the first step toward bringing

position shoved apparent inconsi stency

in Sens.tor Muskie ' s private and public position.
he

announced

ca::aent�d that a preme.ture halt could hurt rather

Senator Muskie

the var

the bombing halt was

suppo

rted negotiations he

Even though

&<Ile calculated riBks

felt that

should be tekan in every decj,eion J!IH.king prooet's ooneerning the
Vietnaaa Wnr.
months

However,

in 1968

prior

In continuati on

be m&intained

tor only two

that position

the

to the elections tb&n dropped

or his po:ll.tion that

e.

negotiated

position.

settlGm.&nt

vas the only vay to and the var, Sana.tor Muek16 said that
vould

be

willing to return

negotintions.

our

pri soners ot war only thrcugh

However, he rurttun- oontendEld that

vitbdrave.l timetable

ehould be

Hanoi

kept onl7

i:t Hanoi

the definite
ve.s

willing

to negotif\te.
t>enator Muskie revealed the.t tha Viotnf.Ulli r&ation pol i cy

pel"llitted Saigon to hftve vo to
Be

povere

over

the vithdraval

method.

t>.lie•ed that this vas poor policy and that Vashiagton ebould

make the decision on bow and vhen to vi thdrav.
M-1-. Muskie f'elt that the policy of Vietnaa1aation va.e
only a tormul a tor perpt;tU».tion of the war .

He �Bo held the

belief 'that the present policy showed no prospeots
peace 1n

for

lasting

Vietnam.

/'.fter Nixon ' s increase of

the

use

o.t

roreea into

Ceabodi& Muskie belieYed that it was a mietalce to go into Uaatbodis,
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and to escaJ.ate the var and that the administration was defeating
i ts purpose of en:y type of vi thdrawal policy.
essence of his proposal that
release of our prisoners,

a

a

He

repeated the

fixed 'Withdrawal date would bring

safe 'Withdrawal of our troops,

a cease-fire and an opportunity to work toward agreements to end
the fighting i n Cambodia and Laos, and an opporttlllity to encourage
Vi�tnam parti e s to negotiate a settlement .
Senator Muskie used the logical form of example to support

and it

his position that a negotiated settlement was needed

only

was

by a negotiated settlement that the war would came to an end.

He

also used six subpoints to support his negotiated settlement
position.

Senator Muskie believed that President Nixon wanted a

military victory and not a political settlement .

Sena.tor Muskie

contended that a political settlement was the only way to end
the war and that a military victory was not possible.
supported this

contention with the use of example.

He again

In support

of Senator Muskie ' s withdrawal policy he used the forms of
support of example and cause-effect.

Senator Muskie believed

that President Nixon was down-grading the Paris peace talks
because he h8d not provided

a.

qualified person to act as mediator .

Senator Muskie contended that Secretary General U Thant should
be asked to hold this position.

3enator Muskie supported this

position 'With the use of example .
the bombing halt in November,

1968,

Senator Muskie believed that
was a necessity and that it

was the .first step in ending the war but before the bombing halt
vas announced he contended that if the action was premature it
could hurt rather than help negotiations.

Senator Muskie had

An apparent inconaistency in his public position and his private

position, because in

January, 1968, he privately

J ohnson asking him to halt the bombing .

risks

as vell

other decisions

e.

as

had

to

be taken

calculated

rning

that sane

He stated

concerning

conc e

wrote to President

the bombing halt

the Vietnam Wer.

position on the bombing halt and one on calcuJ.ated

He held

risk s ,

however, the two positions were not well supported.
Senator Muskie supported hi.s positi on that Saigon should
not have veto powers 0ver the United States in deciding a
withdrawal policy, qy- the

uee

of example.

Sena.tor

Muakie ' e

position on the Vi etnami zati on policy of President Nixon was
that Vietnemi zation would not bring the var to
provided for no lasting
\18.r .

peaoe and

en

end , it

it wae only perpetuating the

He supported that position with several uses of example

demonetreting

where

the present policy was not working.

Senator

MUBkie believed that President Nixon was not consistent with his
own policy beoauee he increasad the use of force s in Cs.;lbodia
and Leos.

Senator Muskie supported his pOsiti on that it

was

poor policy to canmit troops by use of ex8mple.
In providing ethical appeal Senator MUakie established
e.nd supported bis e.uthority to speak on any issue of the Vietnsm
wae as of October,

1969.

to draw a pic ture for

He also used a form of emotional appeal

his li:steners of the kind

of life the

South Vietnamese live under conditions brought on by the war.

In the analysia O"l Seru;.tor Muskie ' s centr al ide-as
research lead to the conclusion

was daninately used for support.

that the logical f onn of example
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Concerning each of the four major policy changea whi ch
were

(1)

}re sident Johnson 1 s escalation policy,

bombing halt,

(3)

(2)

November

J:-re sident Nixon ' s Vietnamization polic7--open

ended versus fixed withdrawal policy,

(4)

prisoners of war issue

as a factor in deciding the type of wi tbdraval system to us e ,
research revealed that Senator Mu::ikie hed never ::;upported any
escalation but rather supported a negotiated settlement .

He

advocated a premature bombing halt may hurt rather than help
the negoti ations but after the bombi ng halt was anncuih;t":d
Senator Muskie said that the action was a necessity and was
the first step in ending th e war; thi s action modified his
position.

Then t"resident Nixon came into office

and initiated

his Vietna.mization policy vhi ch Senator Muskie believed vould
not bring lasting peace and was only a perpetuation of the war.
�resident Nixon ' s Vietnamization policy did not modify Senator
Muskie ' s �sition but it strengthened it in that his position
on withdrawal was strong and his position was finn in setting
a definite timetable of December ,

1969,

1971.

However , in October,

Senator Muskie said he had serious questi, ns about an

immediate withdraval ,, but in Ifovember,

1969,

because of the

lack of success of the Vietnamization policy Mr . Muskie advocated
a fixed 'Withdrawal timetable .

The most recent prisoners of

var issue was of great concern to

Senator

Muskie;

however , he

still contended that a fixed withdrawal would be more successful
for the United States pri soners of var than would the pre sent
policy, but a definite withdrawal timetable should be kept only
if Hanoi would be willing to negotiate.

Senator Mu.skie believed

that if

the United St£.tes wou_1d announce

to

it;

cf

United

Hanoi vouJ d be willlng

fl

tim0tai::1�

s�fe return

to negotiate for thG

States prisoners of var as

well

as the

and etick

rarogining troops

ther\, now.

Conclyd ons

The da.ta coD.ected

end f:>.naJ.yzed in this :::tudy

suggentt>d

the fo1lo'loling conclusion s :

is8ues from 1968

ma,jor

to mid

cho.nge:s dco.J.t with in the

bi a position
In October,

about

��th the

1<)71.

study

exception cf the

withdrawal timetable

sistently argued for

November bombing

halt .

but because of the unsucco�sful

a

was

in November , 1969 , that

neceseary.

negotiated

settlement

R� had con

which incorporates

many· other supporting pcsitionB held by tfoskie .
continuod to support

wou1d

\IRr 'Wfi.S

and

\la.s too

a l ow

be

the
a

wa�

we.r

a

tragic mJstake.

the

ViE.itnamiza.tion rolicy

successful .

strong step

were en

He also

a.esumption that esealntion of

un<l de.ng(;roue t o be

'\d tbdri;;wal de.tf'I
pri soners of

modify

1969 , Mr . Huski� said he had s�rlous que:.;tions

withdrawing our forces

fixed

ma.jor policy

not sig11if:l cant.l.�

did

V:i.etnemi zation policy he advocated
a

'l'ti.e four

Setting a

towa.rd peace.

Our

important ff,ctor in the type: of

""1. thdrawal ve chose.

2.

Senator Muskie ' s misgivings
became

concernlng

mor� intense since 1968.

was not

well

the VietnBlll °W2..r

He admitted in 1966 that

versed in the issue cf

the

he

Vietnam Wsr therefore ,

49
be had

a

tendency to accept other leader ' s positi ons.

Due

to the fact thut he has been one of the prominent contenders
for the 1972 Presidential election, Muskie felt it was

necessary to l�a.rn about the Vi�tnam War issues.

He accepted

the position of a negotiated settlement in 1968 and has
maintained that position.

He a.1eo ms.de a statement in

November, 1968 , concerning hi s withdrawal policy but it

wa.s not until March, 1970, that he developed .§tron& iHsues
on the war.

3.

It could be observed that the majority of Sem.i.tor Mm>kie'
policy revisions were reactionary in nature.
e.

s

That is, as

politica.":"! leader of national prominence he did not generally

initiate an ier.ue but rather took his �·:.::.1 itical position
following the injection of that is sue into the national
political arena.

The lone exception to this appears to

be found in his appeal for Secretary General U Thant to
act as

e.

media.tor betveen waring pertie;s e.t the Paris r.ieaoe

talk .
4.

The means of support that Senator Muskie used most in
devel oping his idee.s vere: his l ogical
provide support for hi o position.

use

of example to

By the l ogicaJ use of

exronple and cause-effect he sufficiently supported his
position;. for a negotiated settlem£'nt

as

we l l as the

aubpoints , Saigon should not have veto powers over ths
United State s , Vietnami zation policy i s intol erable, and
1t

wao

poor policy to commit troops to Cambodia and Le.oG.

50
He failed

to adequa.tely support the two subpoints that

called for

a

be takan.

His

bombing ha.1 t Hnd that calculated ri�!ks shoul d

use

minor in nature .

of ethic a:>. and emotional prooft.> were
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APPENDIX A

5,

February
1971
Spe0ch Departnent
Eastern Illinois Univers
Charle ston, I l l inois 615

Senator li.:<lmund Y.iuskie
�enate Off i e BuiJding

c

'
.

J.:i shing'lion D . C .

Dear S ir:

a�

I am a Gradu� te Student in Speech at Eastern �llinois University.
very much interested in doifle my graduate the sis about you.

I

Would it be possible for · you to send me a c opy of the speeches that you
delivered between \ugust 1968
present date?
Along with these speeches
please n�te the exact d.1.te of the spe,,.ch, the loc�.tion of the speS' ch and
the type of audicn<! e .
This informn.tion is vital to my study.
:

-

,

If t.her� is :rny b i o11,raphica] inforn'ltion :.ihout yourself that you
think wou ld be helpful to me to complete my speaker ' s stuny of you pleas e
enclose th�t also.
Thank you for your cooperation.

Sinc�re1y,
Che�rl Keyser

E D M U N D S. M U S K I E
MAINE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

�!iss Cheryl

!:c�ys8r

Spece!\ Pcpartnent
!':lstC'n\ Il J inois llni versj ty
<'10�0
C:
har1 c -; ton , T J. ] jnoi.s
D,ear

!. l ss
, ,.

v

"cyscr:

Th:m1
T

am

�'ot1

for your n:c:<'n1

l < • t tc r .

J ooking lnto th'.! <tt1csti.011s yo11 hi1vc r<dsccl
\·!iJ 1 hTj tc to you aeain as soon :ts I

vour 1 rttpr :rncl T

ah} c� to pnw i clc yo11

w.i th

a mc�m i nr,ful

response.

Sincere l y ,

l ln i tctl

S<'nator

J.n
CUTl
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February 11, 1971
Speech Department
EAstern Illinois Univ�rsity
Charleston, Illinois 619?.0

Mr. Bob Sheppard
Press Secretary
Senate Office B:1iJc1in�
Washin�on L .C .
DP.ar Mr . �heppard:
I am a Graduate Student in Speech at Eastern Illinois University.
I
am very nruch interested in doing my Graduate Thesis about Senator Mus lde.
For ltzy' s tudy it will be necessary to have sone biographical inforWttion
S ince I have limited my study t o Senator
as well as speeches for analysis.
Muslde ' s Anti-Wa r spe�ches would it be possible for you to send rrr;f copies
of any of his Anti-War speeches delivered from September 1968 until present?
�long with these speeches it is very essential that I know the Location,
Date, and Occas ion of the spe e ches .
'

·,fould it also be possible for you to send rrrJ any biographical information
that is available about Senator Muskie?
Tharik you for your cooperation.
S j ncerely,
Cheryl Keyser

EDMUND S. MUSKIE

JOHN MCEVOY

MAINE

ADMINISTRATIVC A981STANT

JOHN WHITELAW
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT

WASHINGTON, O.C.

20510

February
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ROBERT SHEPHERD
PRESS SECRETARY

18, 1971

Miss Cheryl Keyser
:�peccll Dcpurtmcnt

&.t:;tcrn IJ J lnul:; Unlv1!1:::lty

Charleston,

Illinois

61920

Dear CheryJ :
Thank you for your letter requesting information about
the Senator ' s a nti war speeches for your graduate the si s .
-

En-

closed are a n umb er of speeches and statements as well as bioc;raphical information, which should be helpful

.

succcs� on your pro,ject .
With best wishes,

Robert C .

Shepherd

We wish you
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¥.arch 15, 1971
Speech Departroont
Eastern Illinois University
Charleston, Illinois
61920
Mr. Dob Shenpard

Press Secretary
Senate Office Building
Washington D . C .
Dear ¥.r. Sheppard:

Thank you for sending me some of Senator Muskie ' s speeche s , and remarks
However, the biography of the Senator was not included.
at Press Conferences .
Would it be possible for you t o send � a biography, a copy of Senator
Muskie ' s spe�ch <lelivered in Philadelphia, February 2 3 , on the War and Peace
issue and every other speech or any remarks given by Senator Muskie on the
issue durin6 the 1968 Pres idential Campaign through the present date.
Thank you for your cooperation.
S incerely,
Cheryl Keyser

EDMUND 6. MUSKIE

WASHINGTON, O.C.

20510

Apr i l
Miss

Cheryl

17,

1971

Keyser

Speech Department
Eastern Illinois Unive r s i t y
Char leston,

Illinois 61920

Dear M i s s Keyser :

Thank yuu Vt!ry 111u c h for your rc�Cl!l1L

has l c l l

us

Lo work for

l c lter L u Boh Shephcr<l.

Lle

Lhc Governor o f Maine, an<l I am f i lling in.

I am enclosing the b iography of Senator Muskie which you requested
and I ' m sorry for
of c o p i e s of

the earlier oversight.

the Senator ' s February 23

a few days and

We have t emporarily run out

speech but

should get

them in

I ' l l certa inly send you one as well as other speeches

on the war for which I can locate copies.
You ' l l be hearing from me.

With warmest best w i s h e s ,

I am

Sincerely,

Kay
Senate Press Aide

EDMUND S. MUSKIE
MAINE
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WASHINGTON, O.C.

20!11 0

April

2 6 , 1971

Miss Chery l Keyser
Speech Department
Eaatern Illinois Univer sity
Char leston,

Illinois

61920

Dear M i s s Keyser :
I have pulled together some of the Vietnam speeches you requested
but unfortunately we do not have copies of

some of the older ones for

distr ibut iono
I have enclosed a fairly good sample of the speeche s ,
includ ing Senator Muskie ' s

196� ,

Bates

College on

reprinted in the form o f his Letter t o Maineo

find the
Club

speech at

Senator ' s March S,

in which he more or

1970,

though ,

�at��il!Ill�Da�

You w i l l also

speech before the Natioual P;� s

less reopened the Vietnam debate which had

been dormant during the early �onths of

Pres ident Nixon ' s administration.

I have also enclosed the Senator ' s Declaration of Peace resolution from

May

1970

in July,
speech,

and a copy of an article which appeared in the New York Times
"Out of

it helps

Finally,

Indochina in

18

Months o 11

While the latter

is not a

spell out the Senator ' s Vietnam positiono

there

is a speech g iven at the Un ·i.versity of :Pennsylvania

in February on Vietnruno
Our only copies of the other earlier speeches are here
and should you be

in town at a l l ,

to look at themo

Please give me a call f ir s t ,

(202) 225-5344.

With all good wishes for the

in Washington

naturally you are welcome to come by
thougho

Our number is

success of your project,
Sincerely,

Kay Mills
Senate Press Aide

I am

APPENDIX B

BATEt, COLLEGE
Lmdst�n , Maine

October 15, 1969
I

to Bates

came

becaur.e

can be a time tor learning.
eonoern and

issues of

each other, 8Dd we
to each other and

TcdE11" ' s protest

Vietnam

to reaaon

\Iith

ba'Ye

we

only learn if

can

ve

each

we

are

ot.her.

the President and to those \tho protest.

can

1e

a

si.gn

of

much to learn tram
v1111ng to linen
This applies to

Only in this vq

develop policiea on Vietnam wbieb can aeet

1.ntereeta and end the

Moratorim

It ie a sign ot broken communi cations.

trustration.

I sq that on the

I believe today ' s

ug17 divisione ca.uecl b;r

mr

our

national

iATI>lTement

there.
The right
policy

to have a voice in the denlo�nt of public

carries vith it

that policy.
do should

A

sense

induce sane

a

responsibility tar the reaulte ot

of responsibility tor what.
caution,

we

say and

but it should not impose silence.

One Of the most dangerous assumptions in a democratic socliety
i s to oonc1"'1e

that only

geuerrils are canpetent
As

the

President

the Preeident, the Cabinet and

to

hie

lilake j uigmell'ta on the national interest.

mq be wrong,

hovever, so

11�

we

be vrong.

Our involTement in Vietnam did not hapJ>$n overnight

or

through the decision

post
e.nd

Of one man.

It vas the product of

World War II policies directed against Ccumuniet expanaions

t.hreats of expansion in Europe, .Aaia. dd eleevbere...

It was

66
stimulated by our fear that Cafaunist support for "wars or

11berationtt wouJd topple the a�ing countries of Southeast
Asia e.Dd disrupt the balance ot power

in

that part of the world .

It was encouraged by the concern expresa� by government s

in

that area which telt threatened b;y Communi sh China end North
Vietnam.
We were persuaded that an aggressive Communi sm threat<:ned
to esploit the emerging d.riv• toward nationalism and self

In the uncertain

determination which characterised that erea.
condi tiOOB following the witbdraval
frau

of GE-eat Britain aDd France

Southeast Asia, American power seemed to hold a promise

of security and support for those who 11ved in that area.
Although we followed a polia7 Of "limited" involveme nt in
VietlWI,

we

round our participation growing fr<lll teobnical

asaistance , money and weaponea to massive armed intervention.
We sought to buy time !or the Sout.h Vietnaaese against the

ecabined onslaught of the Vietooiac e:od the North Vietnamese,

but

in the proce ss

w made the struggle an American wer aod

imposed terrible burdens on ourselves at rune and abroad.
Bi8tory will render the final verdict on the visdan
of our decision to enter the V1atJl811 conflict.

Our task i s

more immediate--to set new policies where old plans no longer
apply, and to bring peace where there i s none today.

I

have reached sane co clusions on what may be the

best alternative strategiea

n

and policies, conscious of

Clark Clifford' s observation that "to reach

a

conclusion 8lld

to implement it ere not the same, especially when one does not
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I offer 11'� conclusions ,

have th:.• u1 timate power of decision. 11

not as one 'lolho he.a an absolute conviction of his ovn infallibility ,

but as

one

who seeks to contribute to a constructive policy for

our se lve s and for the people of Southeast Asia.
FIRST, I believe our primary objective�for the Vietnamese
as

well as for AlJlerican eoldi(:.r::.r--should be to end the fighting

and killing i n Vietnam.

SECOND , I be lieve

we

sbould do what wa can to advance the

proBpects for a . political settlement in Vietnam.
we

design or impose that settlement, but

We should not

should do what we can

to make it poesible.
THIRD, I believe

ve

should re-examine the n�turc of

our interests in Southeast Asia and the kinds of efforts

we

can

prudently make to help Asian nations achieve the economic,

social and politi oal etability they want

and need .

It is clearly the deepening conviction of the .American

people that ve must end our present involvement in Vietnsm .
convi ction must control

our

policy.

That

That fnot is reflected in

a number of propose.ls and policies for disengagement, de

Americaniza.tion of the war, withdrava.1 or American forces in
accordance with

a

variety of tormulas and timetables, de

escalation of caubat activities, aDd cease-fire s .
most of these propoaals are the twin objectives:
American involvement, acccmplished in

a

Implicit in
.An end to

ll83' which will enable

the South Vietnamese to carry on without us--as soon as possible

-

in the event
the meantime.

n

negotiated settlement

bas not been achievod in

The various formul as

questions:

(1)

Shou1 d

(2)

by a specified date?
announced?

(3 )

we

Should

ve

for i..rithdravsls raise

commit om-selves to

a

a

number of

totr..l withdrawal.

If n o , should our timetable b() publicly
commit ourselvn s , lmblicly at lea.st,

only as to 'Withdrawal of ground conbat forces--leaving in doubt
the date and conditions fcr 1...ri thdrmdng air aid J.ogistica.l sup:;,>ort '?

Involved in the answers to such que sti ons are the viability

e

of a continu d South Vi�tnemes� eff ort upon our departure, �nd
:c:mintena.nce of pressure upon Htmol

v.nd the Nt:.tional Li berati on

Front to negoti ate.
In the light of our involvement and it s impact upon the
Vietnameoe people--wh0ther or not hi.:;tory judges it to haw: been
wise--do we have

a

responsibility to be concerned about such

questions c.."ld the imp�ct that the
have upon the situation

ve

manner

or ovr dep5rture will

le ave b6bind?

It is difficult to conceive of basic ally new proposalR
to add to those already advanced in a vari ety of forms.

As I

have consider�d all of the se, and the que stions they raise, I
hav3 reached cGrtein conclusions .
1.

J believe we must dieoneage our forces--in f!P

ord erly way�as soon
indicated by

as

possible .

I believe such a policy is

several considerations :

Our efforts

have bought

thr, .South Vietnsmt-)Se people valuable time to develop politiceJ.
and military viability.

Whether er not they have developed the

'Will and the capecity to shape their
at some point .

Th0re is no way for

of thF-.t viability.

own

us

future must be tested

to guernntee the existence

In the last anaJ.ysi s , the Vietnamese people
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must create their

own

�oliticel leedertthif.

our problems here at home dictate that

be orderly

l �lieve
and

now leave their future

and turn our attention to our own .

in their hand�

2.

ve

The imperatives of

th�'t wit�\f�. of oyrmilitary forces should

phased in such

a

way as to ei ve the South Vietn�

people an opportunity to t>..rljust to it.

We should meke it c1ear to

the government in Saigon that our 'Withdrawal is geared to
specific time fre.me to which they roust adjust.
should be left in doubt--e.nd

ve

<.>.

Tho other side

should re serve fJ e��ibili ty--a.s

to the phasing out of logistical and air support.

This point ,

it seems to me, could be relevant to their motivation to negotiate .
Even ae

we

plan our vithdrawal , it should be our objective

to pave the we:y for

a

political settlement between the South

Vietneli governmont, the National Liberation Front , and other
groups reprosanting the several social and political tendencies
in VietnaJU.

The kind of vithdrawal proposal advanced by former

Secretary of Defense C� e.rk Clifford�of those vhich have been
proposed--illustrstes one way to serve thi� objective .

It i s

based on the asslDption that we should continue t o seek a
negotiated settlement in Pari s as we plan for disengagement•
.Accordingly , Secretary Clifford has proposed
which

e.

tvo-sta.ge plan

wuld aove o-ur ground canbat troops out by the end of 1970 ,

and which would provide a1r end logistical support for somewhat
longer .

Such a plan, vhile cutting American casuo.l ties, could

provide an incentive for the South Vietnamese government , the
NGrth Vietnamese, and the National I,iberation Front to reach
a negot1at6d settlement , hopefully even before our withdrawal
is canplete.
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J.

I belieye that a stf,,ndstill cease-fire .might open

tbe va:y for a negotiated settlement and

!00 killing.

This

sugge stion

has

suggests to me its viability.

a quick

end to

the

fighting

been resisted by both sides which

Such

offer could be accompanied

an

by a reduction in our off8nsive operations.

I! the standstill

cease-fire plan succeeded , the withdrawal of United States forc es

could be accelerated

as

international peace-keeping forces stepped

in to insure obseI"lance of the cease-tire .

Ir the standstill

cease-fire otter did not lead to an early end to the fighting,
a steady and methodical withdrawal

plan would offer an effective

vey of reducing United States involvement and combe.t losses,
creating the conditions which favor

a

political settlement .

A stand still cease-fire and

&

staged withdrawal plan

do not rise or fal.1

on

our

the succ�ss of the other , but they could
Each

reinforce each other .

obligations in Vi etnam

particular regime.
politi cal solution.

while

recognizes that our commitment aDd

are

to the Vietnamese people , not to

Each provides

a.

an opportunity for a reasonable

Ea.ch reduces the risk of political repri al s

s

at the end of the war.
What

(1)

I have said, up to th:ls point , is the follolling:

that we carmrl.t ourselves to disengagement;

(2)

that

implement that canmi'b!lent by means of a phased ple.n
geared to a timetable ;

and ,

(3)

that,

we seek to pranote the prospects for

we

of withdro.wal

in planning our 'Withdrawal,
a

negotiated settlement.

There are those who , in thelr frustration, are pre s sing
for immediate, unilateral vithdrawal.

There are others, equally

frustrated, vho suggest escalating the var again.

As to both

these suggestions, I ra1.Ge

tho

I s it :1ot

followil�g questions:

possible that either course could me-�e l�as likely a negotiated

settlement between the pl.!rt.i P, � ;

that

h

eit er cour::.>e could mean

an inevitahle continuation of the var; that either

the

vey for

e

might

open

blood bath in South Vi etnam ; that �ith�r could d��

the prospects for

a

free choice by the South Vietnamese pdople ?

Our po-..er to influence the ahape of post-war Vietnam
seems 11.mited to the way :i.n which

An

deaide to disengage .

ve

abrupt and precipitato diseneageaent co11ld leave chaos behind

us .

To

the extent that we c an avoid

that result , we should try.

A scheduled plan for withdrswa1 of .American

forces neans that

the United States will make its own decirlions e..s a great country

should-with

an apprecj.ation of its own interests, with under

standing or its enemies am concern for ita allies , end

the wiedan to learn from i ta pa.at mistakes.

In too.

with

� cases

in Vietnam ve have al.loved Otlrselves to be diverted by narrow
demands or the Saigon government end defl�cted by the uncertain
responsea of Hanoi.
preesures.

He dr:i.ft.ed with event s

N�w is the

own policies

time for

us

nnd reacted to

tG ansert control

in pursutt of re:asonc.ble

and

over our

ju:::t objectiVt::s.

Now i s the time also to meke clear to

the

Saigon

goTernment t.hat we will not pomi t it to veto

oitr

efforts t.o

explore new \iN'l..ya to end the var.

Saigon blocked the prcposed

three-day cease-fire at the time of Ho Chi Minh' s death .
urged them to broaden their

political

We

base; they r��sponded by

enlarging the cabinet, but narrowing its

political base .

is not om- prerogative to determine the future political

It
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complexion of the Saigon government , s.nd we should not let
it be assumed that

we

have any fixed or irrevocable views on

that score.
!'here are additional steps which might enhance the
prospects for a political settlement&
commi ssion on elections , to avoid

a

agreement on

"vi.mer take

feared by both sides; large-scale reform;

a

a

j oint

all 11 election,

United State s offer

of medical aid, relief, and long-term economic e.nd

teclmical

assistance to both Vietnruns at the conclusion of a settlement .
These are steps for the Vietnamese to initiate, not for

us

to

impose .
I do not assume that the suggestions

I

have made would

guarantee illmediate acceptance by the North Vietnamese and the
National Liberation Front or by the Saigon government .

But I

believe that, taken together , they could provide incentives
for both sides in Vietnam to begin planning for an end to the
milltary contest.
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SFlUTOll B::.JMUJW �. MUSlIE
.;:,·t.

Univenit7 of 1onnea�&
lt�llo , Tonneseect
October 16, 1969

Yeaton..,. ,

October 15th, ll1BJl1 thouser..d of Ali\Grioane

expressed their deep oppo3ition tc tbe Vietn.em var � their
f'crvent d�sil'O for

a

lasting peace.

Ni:wr be.fore ,

in the

histc>ry

ot the Unitod etates, he,s such an �xpresdon.
t
Of public COflOl)rD
end

opinion been reoorded tor ell the VOl"ld. to

dimension or political activism

was

And yet , such an cutpolll"ing

sett

o.nd bear.

added to t.hc �riefUl eys�.

of public (l!iXp2°esrd.on for the

welfare or $11 �n, while it may be without. pl"$cedent in ttw
United �'tatos. , mq

loo�· its ultimat.o erroct unltuso its t\lndemcnte.l

pur�'Ose in being i a sust&1118d .

'fhie is not to oq that we must. bava other dqs Qf

evente

vill

de�mine whet.her or not w m\1$"t.

I believe , however,

that '11,cfi �· ·.:�jlt-for ettect has been s.cbiovQd and vith predictable

Rhetoric will

giw

'WY to di#logue, and deetdG or acccm-
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But beyond the reasons £or this dq of national "moratorium"
lie even gl"9ater demonstrated

needs.

The needs to which I refer

are

for O\n" total national

cc:mn.1taent to the fundamental vurpoile s of our society

.

We have accomplished a great deal in the la.st thirty odd
...

We have achieved greatness by so m� standards .

years.
we

But

have not eliminated econanic hardship tor all; we have not

elillil'l&ted the ri sk of
for evf!ir, American.

ws.r; we h&ve not provided equal justice

Thus , our ve.ry accomplishments serve to

highlight our shortcomings and mistakes, and we are not satisfied.
We are not sati sfied w1 th poJ.i cies which hs.ve led us
into our present difficulties in

S outhe ast

Asia.

We are not

satisfied with policiee which haTe not been able to stem the
l«>rld 1 e drift towards ever greater and costlier nuoleer ri�k f, .

We

are

not satisfied with policies which d o not quiet our fears

and suapicions of each

other .

have not yet become what
free society

we

And we are not

hoped

satisfied

to become in

an

that we

enlightened,

.

>.nd so ve ask question.a .

Isn't that the way of

a

free

society?
Yesterday , a thoughtful and worried nation paused for a
view of the

We

Vietnam war.
are

engaged in the search for a wa:y to end the fighting

and the killing, to give the Vietnamese people the opportunity
to work out their own political destiny-, and to lay the groundwork
for a more appropriate United States policy in Southeast A�ia.
Each of

w; has

engaged in that search in his or her own way .

First, and vithout equivocation,
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I

disengage our !orces - in an orderly way

believe we must

-

as

soon e.s possible.

I would hope the.t our vi thdraval program could pave
the ws:y for a political eettl9lllent between the South Vietnem
gOTernment , the National Liberation Front , and other groups
representing several social and political tendencies in South
To facilitate thie objective,

Vietnam.
ve

I

have edvocated that

propose a standstill cease-fire to open the va:y for negotiated

settlement e.nd

a

quick end to the fighting

and killing.

Suob

an offer could be accompanied by a reduction in our offensive
operations.

I

knov that many Americans, in their frustration

anger over Vietna11

and in their desire to end the

war

and

far the

United State s , are pressing for an immediate end mdle.teral
vitbdraval,

just as et her Americans, equally frustrated , vant

to escalate the var again.

I

have serious questions about

proposals for an immediate \d.thdrawal , and I believe escalation
of the war would be

e.

tragi c mistake.

Is there not a substantial possibility that:
Eith�r course could make less likely a negotiated
settlement

between

the parties?

Either course could mean

a

continuation of the war for

the Vietnamese'?
Either could o�n the ws:y for a blood bath in South
Vietrumi?
Either could dim the chances for e.
South Vietnamese people?

tree

choice by the

?6
I have engaged in that search as a United St�te� Senator

who mi.de tw trips to that part ot the wrld of tbe Menefield ldnsion and
observera group.
with

mou

one

one

ae

pnrt.

ae part ot the 1967 :i:leetion

i'wtber, I have r.ed extensivel7 &lld aonaulted

who know the problean ot Vietnam intimateJ.y.

I havEi reached

aaae

conclu.sione

en

vhat mq bo the beet

elt�rnative strategies and polio1e:s, CODSCiOUO ot Clark Clif'.ford' e
obffr.aUon that ''to reach

a

conclwd.on and to implement it are

not tbe aaae, eepeo1ally vhen

one

does not bavc the ultimate

pcver ot dec1a1on. ti

I off.red rq conclmio;..,_a on alternatift s , not as one
vho be.s

an

absolute conviction ct hiB

as one vho wate to oontribute to
OUl!"selve:a

end tar

First,

a

ow

intalllbillt;y, but

conatnictive policy tar

the people ot Scutbeaa1. 1..eia.

I believe our pri.!lar7 Ci>bjecti"ft - tor the

Vietnamese � well a& for Amerio&.!l soldiers - ahould be to
end the fighting dd k.illing in Vietnam.
�eoODd, I believe we ehould do what we ean to advance the
prospects tor

a

We should not

pol!tical "ttleaeut in Vie tBem.

de�ign or impoese that settlauat, but

we.

should do vh11t we

can to make it possible.
'third ,

I believe w .!llhould reexamine the

:ri"tni"'e ot our

intereste in Southeast A:d a &nd tbe kind:; of offQJ"tu we oan
prudently m.6k� to help Aa1en nationi;

ach ie ve

the t)CODCmic,

social and politioe1 atabillty tbe;y vant end need.
'there u:e, I baliove, sewrel
approach these objectiveo.

avoauee ve

can use to
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I b�lievc

thP-re

are

substwitia.l arg\ll'.ilents for a plan

for disengageroent while ve continue to seek a negotiated
settlement in

has proposed

Paris.

e.

Fol'ller Secretary

of

Defense

Clerk Clifford

two-step plan which would move our ground combat

troops out by the end of 1970 and which would provide air and
l ogi stical support for the South Vietnemeae Army
longer .
provide

Such a plan could out
en

United

for scmewhat

States casualties and

incentive tor the South Vietname se GoverDment, the

North Vietnam.e s& and the National Liberation Front to reach a
negoti3t.d settlement .
A stcdstill

oeaaefire and a atapd withdrawal plan

do not rise or fall on the suooees or the other, but they could
Each recognize that our c<mdtment and

ninf'orce each other.
our

obligations in Vietnam are to the Vietnamese people , not

to a particular regime.

Each provides an opportunity for a

reasonable polltical solution.

Each ref}uces the risk or

political. reprisals e.t the end of the end of the
Our

war.

experience in Viet-nail hae taucht u some paintul

leaaOll8 - leeeonB

a leas painful wq.

ve

vi.sh we Jliibt have avoided or learDed in
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SENATOR MUSKIE11S U THAliT PROI-0�

oN 111ssw MD AM§YEBS". ABc NETWOJJ. oqrom 13· J.969
8enator MuskiG ouggested that .:.oecretary

VletnW!l in arr anging
Thant is

he would be

U Thli.llt

oerve as a mediator among all the factions of South

be asked to

U

General

an
a

Asian

a

oettleme.Clt of the war.

politi cw

Because

and bE:eause he i:l know and respected in Asia,

natural in the role o:f

a

peace broker.

Both the da.igon Goverlllfient and the Natio�al Liberati on

Front in recent initiatives have , by implication, pinpointed the
importance of working out a political settlement in South Vietnam
The Saigon GoTernment has stated

as a key element in a aettlement.

its willingne ss to talk vi.th the National Liberation Front , and
the National Liberation Front requested direct private talks with

the United states Pari s Delegation which could only deal with
political questions .
Senator Muskie said,

"I

am

certain that the only viable

political settlement in Vietnam will be one which the South
Vietnamese work out themselves, but a respected third party could
pave the

vey

for

di scus si ons

leading to such a settlement .

credentials qualify him for such

c.

role.

U

I believe that it would

be useful f<.•r our government to encourage him to assume such

re11pon.U bility . 11

Thant ' s

a
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S'l'ATEMFBT BI SEIATOR !IMtJ1D S. MUSKIE
THI VIS!IJM SPDCB !I PR13IDniT NIXON

ON

lovember 3, 1969

The speech did not announce 8.I\'r new policy.
hope ot many .Americans that the President would give
tor disengagement .

It was the
us

bis plan

That plan has not materiali zed.

Although the President referred at one point to a tixed
timetable for vi�bdrawal , which he said he could not make public,
hie subeequent canments make it clear that it was dependent upon
Saigon ' s capacity to take
to de-escalate the

war.

C1Ver

the war and Hanoi ' s 'Willingne ss

Such a plan, as in tbe past, leavee

the decision as to Ailerican with:ll"awal in Saigon and in Hanoi
rather than in Washington.
Moreover, the President appeared
to possible escalation of the

to leaTe the door open

war .

In addition, I was disappointed that

ve

were not told of

initiatives aimed at settling the political questions involved-
quaationa which

are

the Vietna problem.

at the heart ot &l\Y final resolution of
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l.lINb� IN HONOR OF

CONGR!:SSMAN JEFFERY COHELAN
OAKL�"iD , CALU'ORNli\
NOVnIBER 14, 1969
'trhen the f'resident of the United States speaks to the
nation on

a

matter of major foreign policy, � responsible

luncrican tas an obligation to ponder the l resident1 s wu:tds,
a.s

well e.s bis deeds, most

carefully.

It i s

important to the

nation that the l-resident be supported on such issues to

mwd.mum possible

e:r.:tent,

tha

so long as his policies appear to be

in the best intere st of thEl nation.
I must be frank to admit that the President ' s speech
on VietnruJI was

a

great disappointment to

me.

At fir st I

roflected on wtether that di sappointment was simply the result
of the advance build-up that he.d

not

vas done

House

j ust

by

h::en given to the speech.

the prese and other

media,

but by

This

the 1-l'hite

itsolf, and by the leadership of the President • �; own party�

Clearly the nation was given reason io believe that its hopes
for peace were Justifiabl7 high, that eignificant new steps to
advance those hopes were about to be taken.
But tho important issue i s not whether I or the
generally were disappointed.

people

Th� import&.nt issue is whether

the policy expressed by the i:rcsident is sotmd .

Regretfully I
ment did

did

not

meet the

have concluded that the Pre sident ' s statem

edo of the times and i s not adequate s.nd

not me.rk out a clear road to peace in Vietnam nor to security
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for the UJ:rlted States either abrosd or at hane.

The President' s

reliance upon the fact that his four predeoessorD in office,
!residents Truman, Eli.senhower, Kennedy

end

Johnson, each

expressed a strong view on the iDportanee or Indochina

and

Vietnam to the security of the United States, i s misplaced.
What P.reaident Nixon

has

a!titted

expressed at different times

snd

is

that those views were

UDder different c1rcunatances.

The requirements of 1969 and 1970 for the United States of
.America are not necessarily the same as the requirements

or

the United States under President Truman in the 194C ' s , under
President Eisenhower in the 195C ' s, or even under �esident
Kennedy

and

President Johnson in the early

and

mid 1960 ' s.

Many important changes have occurred both in the world
and here at bane.

Our national policy must be dynamic and

must remain able to meet the challenge of new conditions, con
sisteuey with the past alone, where

a

policy

is

costly, i s

little justification for continuation of the.t policy.
'm:f

It is

belief that the President' s appeal to the eo-ce.lled silent

American

majority not only misj�gea the temper of the true

majority of the nation,
and of

but

misjuiges the needs of the nation

tbe world .
We

have given the South Vietnamese an opportunity to

develop the capacity or defend themselvee .
States there has been
and men, and

help

ot

to have the capacity

a

huge outflow of arms, training, mone¥

every sort.
to

from the United

But for

the

South Vietnamese

defend themselves, they must have a

Government that rallies broad aupport

in

South Vietnam,

and
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the will to fight for their irukt;endence.

As former Secretary

of Def'unse Glifford, Amba:.1sador Harrinw.n , and many others have

said, both publicly an<l ;.:.rivately, the present Govermnent of
Scuth Vietnam has been unwilling t o broaden its base snd
make the reforms .necessary to rally th€ people.

The present

Government of South Vietn�""{; has bean unwilling to
aey adequate way the burden of self-defense

-

shoulder

in

it has preferred ,

where possible, to fight to the last ./ll'la
l ricsn.
Moat ,\mericans want
which p�rmit3

an

orderly di sengagement from Vietnam.

the Sou:th Vietnamese to adjust to that disengagement

and to prepare for naw poli ti\'.!al relationships in Vietnam .

This

aan be aocornplished onJ.y when the present South Vietna..�ese
Government recognizes there is no room �or negotiation with
the Unit ed States on this issue;
1re siden.t

when it is made clear to

'I'hieu and Vice Pr&sident Ky that tht.::ire is no longer

an opportunity to defer, and then defer again, American troop
v.ithdrawals.

It can only be

accom:plished if the Ullited States

places clear, unmistakable , and nonnegotiable requirements on
the Govorn::-;ant of South Vietnam to take those steps necessary
to broad<�D 1 ta base, obtain the support of the coimtryside, e.nd

take on in fact instead of in words, the battle for its

ow

independence.
T:'.
; G se

arc-

the major changee in the world as it relates

to Vietll&Jil--the Sino-�oviet Schism, the atabilizing of

e ast

Asia,

their

South

the unwi.llingness of the South Vietname se to shoulder

burden.

The

de�.tn of Ho Chi Minh, which deprived the

.liorth Vietname se of the;ir principal rallying point and strong
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leadership also cannot be ov&rlooked.

But no change has been

more important than those which took place in the United States
itself.
In the last few years,

we

the richest nation in the world,

have di scovered that our resources

not unlimited--or at

are

least that the willingness of the Government and the public to
commi t those resources i s not 1m11mit ed.

The threat to the

dollar abroad, 'the drain or inflation at home , have placed
severe limits on our ability as

a nation to make �cial

commitment& to solving problems which can no longer wait for
Today

resolution.

we

have record high interest re.tee, con

tinuing inflation, and al so groving unemployment , with no
assurance that any of theae problems�inflation, tight money ,
or unemployment--e.re under control or even caning under control .

Today

w

have citiel5 that are turning into wasteland s .

They are starving for fund.a for schools, tor housing, for
opportunity.

President Nixon baa proposed an ambitious revision

of the welfare lava, and yet it is clear that as long as
Vietnem is our maj or preoccupation, the funds are not available
for that revi sion.
We ea.rmot let our cities go further dovn the drain.

We cannot let our school ayetema, once the greatest in the
world, collapse under the v.ight
available 1

ot more students, less money

and outmoded teaching methods.

We cannot continue

to den: those who have not had an equal opportunity their
rightful. place as Aaerioan citizens.
the way

of

doing what needs to

Yet Vietnam stands in

be done.

Our fight against

disease, the battle to clean up
toward

our e1r and water , our progress

better housing, all have been halted by" tbe buiget

constraints reeUl.ting fr(l!I Vietnam.
Perhaps most important,
values

we oannot a!f'ord to see the

and the goals of this nation torn apart by the divisions-

black and vbite, young and old, dove
our socity in recent years.
corrent in

and bawk--that have

shattered

Pre sident Nixon may or may not be

hie 'etated belief- that be speaks tor, or to, a silent

I

maj ority--but

know he has spoken to a

deepl7 concerned and

upset cowrt17.
I do not put
Nixon ' s

this

var

on President Nixon' s

back as

var, ror it is the product of the enti2"e po•t-war

develoi:aeat
President

ot Jaerican foreign· policy.

But I do put

llxcm ' a back the responsibility

on

after ten months

now,

in office, to mo�e the nation in the right direction--to take

the UD.1.ted States out ot the Vietname se War.
vas wrong in
precipitate

President

Nixon

hie speech when be de scribed the alternatives

as

withdrawal or hie pl an- a plan which he never really

described.

There may be time s for secrecy in the conduct of our
nation' s affairs, but by and large thi s nation functions best
out in

the open, with its people well informed.

that Pre sident

My belief i s

Hixon has s<:ne real choices vbioh neither require

precipitate vithdraval nor simply asking the public to have faith
th8.t he has sane unspecitied plan to Vietnamize the var.

The

steps I belisve should be taken, and which the President still
oan

tek.e, are as tollovs:

85
1.

I

'believe

we m\l§t disengage Ourforces--in

we,y�as eoop as possible.

an

orderly

I believe eueh a policy i s indicated

by several considerations:

our efforts have bought the South

Vietnemese people valuable time to develop political and military
viability .

Whether or not they have developed the will and the

capacity to shape their
There is no

vsy

for

t15

own

future muet

be

tested at some point .

to guarantee the existence of that via.bill t� .

In the last analysis , the Vietnamese people must create their
own political

leadership.

The imperatives

of

our problems here

at home dictate that w now leave their future in their hands
and turn our attention to our

own.

2. l btlieye tho.£ withdrawal or ow milijlary forces shou1d
be orderly pd phe.sed

in such a way as to

people an opportupity to &dJust to it.

rlye the South Vietnamese

We should make it clear to

the government in Saigon that our llithdrawal is geared to
time frame to wh.1.ch they
left in doubt--and
out of logistical

we

end

must

edjust.

a

specific

The other side should

be

should reserve flexibility--as to the phasing
eir support.

This point, it

seems

to me,

could be relevant to their motivation to negotiate.
Even as

ve

plan our vitbdre.wal, it should be

our

objective

to pave the way for a political settlement between the South
Vintnem Government, the Netional Liberation Front, and other
groups representing the several social and political tendencies
in Vietnem.

The kind of withdrawal proposal ndvanced by Former

Secretary of Defenee Clark Clifford�of those which have been
proposed-illustrates one vay to serve this objective.

It is

based on the assumption that we should continue to seek a
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negotiated settl£:Smant in i?e.ris as we plen for dir.enga.gcmcnt
.Accordingly , Secrato.ry Clifford has proposed

two- stage pltm

ground combat troops out by the end of 1970,

our

vhich would movs

a

•

and vhich would provide air and logi sti caJ. support for somewhz.t
longer.

Such a plan, while cutting Ameri

c an

ca::;ue.lties, could

provide an incentive for the t>outh Vietname se Government, the
North Vietnsmese,

and th6 National Liberation Front to re�ch

a negotiated settlement , hopef'u1ly even before our "11. thdrawal

is <.;.omplete .
I believe that a �talldsti ll cease-fir� might open

J.

tbe wv for

a.

negotiated §ettlemfill_t tmQ, a.

fighting ang killing .

bot.h

sides

which

Ttiis suggestion hP-s been re:-ii sted

3Uf<p,;\'.. sta to

could be accompani ed by

If the

standstil

l

QJ&ck_!trl<t. ..
]
.9
�

a

me

ite viability.

by

Such an offer

reduction in our offensive operc.ltior;s.

cease-fire plan succee.ded , the wi thdra.weJ

United States forces could be accelP.r�ted

of

as international

:µei..ce-ke<::ping forces stepped in to insure obeervt'.ncc of th·:i
cease-fire .

lf the standstill cease-fire offer did not lead

to an early end to the fighting, a steady end methodical v.ith

draval plan. would offer

en

effective wrq of reducing United States

involvement and comba.t losses, vhile creati ng the conditions
vhich favor a political settlement.
A standsti.1.1 cease-fire eDd a staged w1thdrawel c} an
do not rise or fall

on

reinforce each other.

the success of the other , but they could
F.ach recogni zes that our commitment and

our obligations in Vietruun are to the Vietns.meae people, no't
to a psrticular regime .

Each provides an opportunity for

a

reasonable political solution.

Each reduces the risk of

political reprisals at the end of the war.
In too
to

be

cases in Vietnam we have allowed ourselves

man;y

diverted by narrow dem�nds of the Saigon Government and

deflected

by

with events

the
and

uncertain responses of Hanoi .

reacted to pressures.

We drifted

Nov is the time for us

to assert control over our own policies in pursuit of reasonable
and

just objectives .
Uow i s the time also to make clear to the Sti.Jc:.on

Government that we will not permit it to veto our efforts to explore
new vays to end the var.

Saigon blocked the proposed three-dSJ"

ceass-fire at the time of Ho Chi Mihn' s death.

We

urged th&m

to broaden their political base; they responded by enlarging
the cabinet, but

owing its political base.

narr

It is not our -

prerogative to determine the future political complexion of the
Saigon Government,

and

we

should not

l$t

it

be

assumed that

ve

have any fixed or irrevocable views on that score.
There are additional steps which might enhance the
a

commiaeion

elections, to avoid a "vinner t&lce

on

political settlement:

�greement on a joint

prospects for

ill ''

election,

feared by both sides; large-scale reform; a United States offer
of medical aid, relief, and long-term economic and technical

assistance to both the Vietnems at the conclusion of a
settl8J1lent .
not for

us

These are steps for the Vietnamese to initiate ,
to impose .

I do not assume that the suggestions I have

me.de would

guarantee immediate acceptance by the North Vietnamese and the
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National Li ber,1tion Front or by th<? S�deon Government.

But I

believe that, taken to�ethe r , they could provide incentive s for
both side s in Vietn8111 to

begin

pl anni ng for r.n cmd to the

militery cont.est.

a sked to serve ap

a med iator

emonK-J!ll the factions of Scuth

Vietnam in sei� the stage for

�·

Because

U

Thant

.•

an

e

ool iti cal settlenent of

the

Asi an and because he is known

re spected in Asis., he wou..ld �

a

nature., i n the rol.c of

e.

peace

broker.
Both the Saigon Gov�rment and th<=: J�a.tiont:l Li l'Cratj on
Front in r�cont initj ativea hav0 , by inpli c�ti on,
the imµortance of working out

a

Vietnam as a key element in

settlement .

a

pinpolnt�d

<,, : "t J em0nt in ...:cuth

poli ticnl

The baigon Government

has stated its willingn1'ss t o tnlk 'With th� Nati onf,l

Liberation.

Front, and the tfation61 Liberation Front r a que nted direct
private talks with the Unit�d Stat�s l)ari ::: Delegation which
could only deal "1th political qu<:: stions.

I am certain that the only viable :_,ol i ti�aJ. settlecent
in Vietnrun "111

be

theMselve s , but

e

ssi ons

discu

one which the South Vietnamese

\.1ork out

respected third pc:i.rty could ::·�\ · · the we.y for

leading to such a settlement .

qualify him for such

&

role.

U Thant ' s credentials

I believe that it vould be useful

for our Gov�rnment to encourage him to �ssume such a responsibility.

I "Want to
anyone should ,

make

clear that I do not ,

and I

do not beli eve

quarrel with the President ' s sincerity of purpos e .

Nor d o I quarrel with the sinceri y of purpose o f those who

t

R.dvocate either esce.latioa of the
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var,

OJ"

:llllmediate end precipitate

of

\If thdr�val , or si11lply the course (it 1t can be called that )

having blind faith in the President.

What

those choices ere unreel and not likely
steps

I haveoutlined

I do say i s that

to be productive .

� not accanplish everything

we

The

desire,

but I believe they provide the best wrq tor obtaining an honor
able and secure

peace

in Vietnam , and a peace which i s fully

consistent 'With our proper interest in that pert of the world.
Finally, one word for those who quite properly have
exr..iressed concern about our treaty canmitments and our possible
loss or face in the world.

Any nation that bas suffered a

quarter or a million c&sualties, as

we

have in Vietnam , and

over forty thousand deaths, a1'ld spent over thirty billion dollars
e.

yt!lcr, has met its commitments.

Our commitments are to assist

We gave much

South Vietnam and not to do the job ourselves.

of ourselves &s a nation in Vietnam--e.nd in so doing

we

exercise

the restraint or a great power in \IOrld leadership by not
unleashing our full power with the horror of nuclear veapons and
the risks or direct confrontation with the Soviet Union or
Comnnmi at China.

We need have no thought that

we

did not measure

up to the rull le-Yol of our rc6poneibi11 ties and camnttments.
Our responsibilities, r:ot.rcver, are not just to Vietnmn,

but to ourselves

e.s

a

nation, s.nd to all \Ibo still believe

that in the American revolution i s the great hope or mankind.

Let us recogni � vh&.t our cOllmlitments truly

are ,

what our

security needs truly are, what other major neglected
wo must f aoe and aolve , and then go forward.

Such

a

Problems
program
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will in hi story- be judged

as

meeting the true demand or American

leadership of the free world and will help create

p�.rtner �;hi}'.: of free men everywhere.

a

meRningful

RFl':J..RKS BY SENATOR EDMUND S. l-nJSKIE

CALIFORNll\ DEMOCRATIC STATE CONVENTION
S.l.CRJJ.:EN'l'O, 0ALIFORNIA
J ANUAliY

As Democrats, we have
Wf)

23 , 1971

an

obligation, to the peopl e whose votes

sought in November, to offC::;r new directions for the

which

arc;

clear, -which

persuaded to foJ low.
economy .

are

ne.tion ,

dlre(;tions

sensible, and which the people ca.a be

Thri.t means not only moving to revive our

It means aluo le aving a war we should never ha.ve entc.red.
\.le must withdraw our troops from the jungles of Indochin�.,

for there is no lasting peace in our present policies, and there i s
no prospect i n those policiBG fcr

an

end to the suffering of the

people of Vietnam and Cambodia and Laos.
I have urged that the United States set a deadline for the
withdrawal of all our forces from Vittnam.

There is reason to

believe that such a deadline could provide the basis for
negotiated settlement between North and South Vietnam.

e.

There i s

little doubt that i t couJd qui ckly lee.d t o an agreement for the
release of .A?Dericans held prisoners-of'�war, and for the sate withdre.wal of all our men.
Yet, while gradually wi thdra\ling our combat forces from
South Vietnam , as it should , this Administration i s step

by

step

increasing the level of our military activities in Cambodia. and
over the skies of North Vietnam.
gunahips,

as

vell

as

For example, U . S . helicopter

aircraft , are now operating inside Cambodia
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in direct support of Canbodian and South Vietnamese soldiers.
The road out of South Vietnem does not lead through Cambodia.
for the Administration to pursue this course, displays

an

And

utter

disregard, not only for the voice of Congress in foreign affairs ,
but also for the .Administration' s

O\.ln

words , early last summer,

that these military actions in Cambodia would Il.21 be lmdertaken.

PREl'AiED ll!MABIS, SUNDAY EVDIIG

JANUARY .31, 1971

B.AJl'lJORD , OOHNECTICUT

no

ltt.sting peace in the poli<.:y of Viet1llaill.1 �tion and thsrG is

Vietnamese

people .

forces frca

It ia right of course to withdraw our combat

�ut.h Vietnam,

J.S ve

But, it is wong

are doing.

to 1acreaee tbe level Of our military

act1v1te:. in Cambodia and

over the sk.iee of North Vietnam.
Is this the plan wo were promised in. 1968?

bt

this Admini•tration last JUlle that it would !l.J

support m.iseiona inside

Cambodia.

Wh&.t are

we

to

Jen'Ul.lrJ° when the Secret817 of Def�nse ditillli s.. a

We have tried in the Collgresa to
involveent ill Cambodia.
ameDdl!lent

We
DO

vero told
combat

beli�ve in

this pledge as

li1o.it America's

And if the letter of tbe Coo}X;r- Church

is not cleer enoUill to preserve

tba_.t

limit, then I

believe we must make it cleOl".
I believe

we

must llmit our militer;y pr e sence not only

in Cc.mbodia, but al.so in Laos a::Jd in Vietnam.
ve

Aud I believe

•'18t commit �l:I'sel.ve s firml.J to the cc::aplete vi�awal or

0111"

forces

auoh ia

tr<11 Indoohina by a fixed and def'ini te date.

certain-the onl.7 light at tlw end

the one we etrike ourselves .

This

of the tunnel will be

J.nd if this Niministration does not

ha�e the courage to strike that light,

then a new coalition will.

f'R
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J tlmARY 31, 1971
HARTFORD, CONN ECTICUT

The Ji.dmini stration

of course deuit:B it.

to me that ve are engaged in the

seme

But it

:.;oo:;ms

old g8Dle of assuming that

a little more military activity might turn the tide and might
bring us that "victoryH that has e scaped

us

for so long.

The first disturbing aspect of the present military
acti Yity in Indochina is that
to be our policy.

1t departs trom :what I Wlderstood

That polic7 vas firat establi shed

by the

fresident • e ovn restriction on the use of air power over Cambodia,
as

announced

laet sumner .

At that tillle , the President said that

American air pover would be llmited to the interdiction of
eupplie{; moving from Cambodia into South Vietnem.
uae of air power in th• Highva;r

4

understood to be that restriction.

Nov, the recent

incident went beyond vhat

I

And I think this is 'What

disturbs aembers or Congress.
The other part ot our policy of course was the limitation
on the use of ground canbat troops in Cambodia.

That limitation

vas imposed by the Cooper-Church Amendment .
These tvo elements , the President ' s announced limitation
on the use of air po\oer and the Congress ' s limitation on use of
ground combat forces , constituted our policy

as

we tmderstood it,

with respect to .�erican military activity in Cambodia.
policy has changed , to what extent we're not yet sure.

Now that

I

think

that it is appropriate that the Congr$sS inquire into the matter
to as.certain to what extent the policy is bei ng modified.

In any

event , whatever tl:te lim1 tations whicb thf.l Auministra.tion ha:; in
mind , the fact of the matter is, that at this point , it
mill tary activity in Indochina.
involvement--at

least

we

I

must stop

escalating

Down that road lewis further

that has been

the lestlon of our invol vement

in Vietnw.i for the le.st 6 or 7 years.

I think

is

I think we must resist it.

it.
I hope our boys

hope it i s no longer an issue by 1972 .

are h0t1e , and that the whole thing i s behind
would be my !!druthers, n to use an old

m:

by 1972.

That

Maine exprt:Jssion.

I am looking a.t several propositions, the result of nll
of whi ch would oo to set a definite d ate for withdrawal .
introduced a resolution in May of thi s pa:-lt year

I

vhicb would have

made the eod of 1971 or January 1 , 1972 , the deadline for with
drawal.

Lt that time it would h�.ve been about 18 months.

date still look s like a gocd deadline.

This

And might I remind us all,

thht if that deadline were met, we vould have been involved in
the war in Indochina for as long after tho 1968 election as we
were before.
at that tim$.

And it seems thet

we werB

told that it

we.s

too long
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I sav the pictures their children have drawn and hung on
the walls of these veI71 same shelters -- pictures 'With no explo5ives
in them , no airplanes or tanks, no people 'with gWls.

'Ihey a.re

pictures of peace - of the land and of the things they gro\l on
the land, of birds in the sky , and of people at vork or at rest.

I

am convinced we muet do all we can to help make these pictures come
true .

